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06/20/2024
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
Assigned on Briefs October 4, 2023

ROBERT ALLEN DOLL, III v. BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County
No. 22-0363-II Robert E. Lee Davies, Senior Judge
___________________________________

No. M2022-01723-SC-R3-BP
___________________________________

In this case, an attorney appeals the recommended sanction of disbarment after three
criminal convictions. The attorney was convicted by a jury of two counts of subornation
of aggravated perjury and one count of criminal simulation, all Class E felony offenses and
serious crimes under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 22. All three criminal
convictions arose out of the attorney’s conduct in representing a client. In the ensuing
disciplinary proceedings, a Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel
recommended disbarment. The attorney appealed the hearing panel’s decision to the
chancery court, which affirmed. The attorney appealed to this Court. On appeal, the
attorney argues the hearing panel should have reviewed similar cases of attorney
misconduct where a suspension was imposed, and that he should be suspended based on
the sanction imposed in those cases. Under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, Board of
Professional Responsibility hearing panels and trial courts considering attorney discipline
promote consistency in the imposition of sanctions by anchoring their decisions on
punishment to the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
Rule 9 does not give either hearing panels or trial courts authority in attorney disciplinary
cases to base recommended attorney disciplinary sanctions on a review of sanctions
imposed in comparative cases. The Supreme Court’s more expansive perspective from
seeing the broad swath of attorney disciplinary matters in the entirety of the State—whether
appealed or not—puts it in the best position to consider comparative cases for the sake of
uniformity of punishment throughout Tennessee. In this case, considering the nature of
the attorney’s misconduct, no comparable case convinces us that suspension, rather than
disbarment, is the appropriate sanction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
chancery court and the decision of the hearing panel and impose the sanction of disbarment.
Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(d); Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed.

HOLLY KIRBY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JEFFREY S. BIVINS, ROGER
A. PAGE, SARAH K. CAMPBELL, and DWIGHT E. TARWATER, JJ., joined.

Peter J. Strianse, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Robert Allen Doll, III.

James W. Milam, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellee, Board of Professional
Responsibility.

OPINION
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The respondent attorney in this case, Robert Allen Doll, III, has been licensed to
practice law in Tennessee since 2003. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9,
section 33.1(d), he appeals the discipline imposed by a hearing panel of the Tennessee
Board of Professional Responsibility (“BPR” or “Board”).

On May 17, 2017, Mr. Doll was convicted by a Williamson County jury of two
counts of subornation of aggravated perjury, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated
section 39-16-705, and one count of criminal simulation, in violation of Tennessee Code
Annotated section 39-14-115(a)(1)(c).1 See State v. Robert Allen Doll, III, No. II-

1
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-705(a) defines “subornation” as: “A person commits
an offense who, with the intent to deceive, induces another to make a false statement constituting perjury
or aggravated perjury.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-705(a). Addressing aggravated perjury, Tennessee Code
Annotated section 39-16-703(a) states: “A person commits [aggravated perjury] who, with intent to
deceive: (1) Commits perjury as defined in § 39-16-702; (2) The false statement is made during or in
connection with an official proceeding; and (3) The false statement is material.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
16-703(a). Also addressing aggravated perjury, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-703(b) provides:
“[i]t is no defense [to an aggravated perjury charge] that the person mistakenly believed the statement to be
immaterial.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-703(b).

On criminal simulation, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-115 provides:

(a)(1) A person commits the offense of criminal simulation who, with intent to defraud or
harm another:

(A) Makes or alters an object, in whole or in part, so that it appears to have value
because of age, antiquity, rarity, source or authorship that it does not have;

-2-
CR078988-B (Williamson Cnty. Tenn. May 17, 2017). The discipline at issue arises out
of these criminal convictions, described below.2

Underlying Criminal Convictions

Mr. Doll practiced law with an association of attorneys in middle Tennessee. His
practice largely consisted of family law. State v. Doll, No. M2019-00236-CCA-R3-CD,
2020 WL 7231101, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2020), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. May
13, 2021). The support staff for the association of attorneys consisted of a person at the
front desk, Mr. Tim Carter, who was a notary public. Id.

Pamela Denise Van Burkleo hired Mr. Doll in 2010 to represent her in divorce and
post-divorce proceedings against her ex-husband, who was in Texas. The criminal
convictions underlying the discipline in this case arise from Mr. Doll’s representation of
Ms. Van Burkleo in the post-divorce proceedings. Id. at *1.

By the time the events underlying the criminal convictions arose in 2013, Mr. Doll
had been representing Ms. Van Burkleo for several years. In early 2013, Ms. Van Burkleo
had concerns about her children visiting with the ex-husband, so she asked Mr. Doll to file
an emergency petition to restrict his parenting time. On March 1, 2013, an emergency ex
parte petition was filed in the Williamson County circuit court on behalf of Ms. Van
Burkleo, to prevent her ex-husband from exercising his visitation with their children. Id.
at *5. Affidavits from each of their two teenage sons were attached to the petition. Id.
The emergency petition had an oath by Ms. Van Burkleo appended to it, as part of the
petition. Id. Ms. Van Burkleo’s signature on the oath was notarized by Mr. Carter, and
Mr. Doll signed the petition as her attorney.3 Id. On the basis of this petition, the first trial

(B) Possesses an object so made or altered, with intent to sell, pass or otherwise
utter it; or

(C) Authenticates or certifies an object so made or altered as genuine or as different
from what it is.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-115.
2
Mr. Doll appealed his criminal convictions to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. See State
v. Doll, No. M2019-00236-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 7231101 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2020), perm. app.
denied, (Tenn. May 13, 2021). The record for the underlying criminal case is not part of our record in this
disciplinary appeal, so the facts of the events that form the basis for the criminal convictions are taken
largely from the Court of Criminal Appeals opinion and its recitation of the facts at trial.
3
Mr. Doll testified to the BPR hearing panel that another attorney in his association of attorneys
filed the petition while he was out of town and obtained the ex parte temporary restraining order.

-3-
judge granted a temporary restraining order enjoining the ex-husband from exercising his
parenting time with the children.4 Id.

Later, on March 26, 2013, a second trial judge, Judge Timothy Easter, conducted a
hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order should be extended.5 Id. One
of the attorneys in Mr. Doll’s association of attorneys appeared at the hearing to represent
Ms. Van Burkleo because Mr. Doll was still out of town. Id. Ms. Van Burkleo testified
under oath at this hearing that she had not signed the emergency petition. Id. Judge Easter
then asked Ms. Van Burkleo directly whether she signed the emergency petition in front of
a notary public, and she answered that she had not. Id. Judge Easter declined to extend
the temporary restraining order, set another hearing for April 23, 2013, and said he wanted
to hear from Mr. Doll on the issue at the hearing. Id.

When Mr. Doll returned from out of town, he learned of the events during his
absence. He filed another petition on behalf of Ms. Van Burkleo, identical to the initial
emergency petition, with an oath executed by Ms. Van Burkleo and affidavits executed by
her sons. The Williamson County circuit court, however, never reached the merits of the
second petition.

Mr. Doll appeared at the April 23, 2013 hearing as ordered. Id. He was not under
oath, but he assured Judge Easter that Ms. Van Burkleo was in his office the day the
emergency petition was signed, and that she had reviewed it. Id. Mr. Doll professed not
to know why Mr. Carter would notarize a signature that was not Ms. Van Burkleo’s
signature. Id. Judge Easter told Mr. Doll that he and Mr. Carter were potentially facing
criminal charges and advised them to get counsel. Id. He set another hearing for May 7,
2013. Id. at *6.

Judge Easter asked the District Attorney General for Williamson County to attend
the May 7, 2013 hearing. Id. At the hearing, Mr. Doll appeared but did not testify under
oath. Id. He told Judge Easter that his calendar indicated he prepared the emergency
petition for Ms. Van Burkleo on March 1, 2013, some two hours before Ms. Van Burkleo
came to his office to review and sign the documents. Id. At this hearing, one of the other

4
In later proceedings, the first trial judge, who granted the emergency petition, said that if the
petition had not included Ms. Van Burkleo’s sworn oath, the clerk’s office would not have submitted it to
him for review. Doll, 2020 WL 7231101, at *5. He explained that the oath required an affiant like Ms.
Van Burkleo to swear to the truth of the facts in the petition, as shown by the notarized signature, in the
same way a witness would take an oath to tell the truth before testifying. Id.
5
There was no court reporter at this hearing.

-4-
attorneys in Mr. Doll’s office appeared to represent Mr. Carter, and told Judge Easter that
Mr. Carter was this attorney’s employee. Id. Judge Easter set a show cause hearing for
June 18, 2013.6 Id.

At the June 18, 2013 hearing, Mr. Carter was represented by a criminal defense
attorney. Id. Mr. Carter’s counsel called Ms. Van Burkleo to testify. Id. In her testimony,
Ms. Van Burkleo claimed that she had, in fact, signed the oath on the emergency petition.
Id. She said that, at the prior hearing, her response to questioning by Mr. Van Burkleo and
Judge Easter was only that her signature “looked different” on the emergency petition. She
insisted that the signature on the petition was in fact hers and that she had signed it in the
presence of Mr. Carter. Id. Ms. Van Burkleo commented that, from time to time, she
would change up her signature. Id.

At the same hearing, Mr. Doll asked Ms. Van Burkleo whether she had “come in
[his] office . . . with all three children on March the 1st to sign the [emergency] petition,”
and Ms. Van Burkleo said she did. Id. Judge Easter pointed out to Ms. Van Burkleo that
her answer was not consistent with her previous testimony under oath. Id. Nevertheless,
Mr. Doll pressed forward to ask Ms. Van Burkleo if Mr. Carter was present and notarized
her signature on March 1, 2013, and Ms. Van Burkleo said yes. Id. In light of Ms. Van
Burkleo’s testimony, Judge Easter said there was no longer an issue about her signature on
the emergency petition. Id.

On July 13, 2015, the District Attorney General obtained grand jury indictments
against Ms. Van Burkleo and Mr. Doll. Id. at *1. Counts 1 and 2 alleged that Ms. Van
Burkleo committed aggravated perjury when she testified falsely under oath that a notary
public witnessed her sign an affidavit in support of her emergency petition for a temporary
restraining order against her ex-husband. Id. The indictment also alleged that Ms. Van
Burkleo testified falsely during the show cause hearing to determine the authenticity of her
notarized signature. Id. Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment alleged that, on June 18, 2013,
Mr. Doll committed subornation of aggravated perjury with regard to the same emergency
petition. Id. Count 5 alleged that Mr. Doll committed criminal simulation on March 1,
2013 by forging Ms. Van Burkleo’s signature on the oath on the petition. Id.

Mr. Doll was tried on the criminal charges before a Williamson County jury, and
Judge Mark Fishburn presided over the trial. At the trial, the State presented evidence from
Ms. Van Burkleo’s employer that she was at work on March 1, 2013 at the time the
emergency petition was signed and notarized. Id. at *6. Mr. Carter testified that he did not

6
The Court of Criminal Appeals’s opinion appears to refer to this hearing as a “show cause”
hearing, but the reference is not entirely clear. Doll, 2020 WL 7231101, at *1.

-5-
recall anything about the emergency petition, including whether he notarized the signatures
of either Ms. Van Burkleo or Mr. Doll. Id.

Ms. Van Burkleo testified that Mr. Doll represented her in post-divorce proceedings
in her efforts to change the visitation arrangement with her ex-husband because she was
concerned for the physical and mental safety of her children. Id. As summarized by the
Court of Criminal Appeals, Ms. Van Burkleo testified at trial about the signature on her
oath for the emergency petition and why she had given prior inconsistent statements about
it:

She agreed that at the March 26, 2013 hearing, she said that the signature on
the petition was not her signature. She said she told Judge Easter that she
had no idea who had signed the document.

Ms. Van Burkleo said that, the following day, [Mr. Doll] called her
and seemed irritated and said “don’t you remember giving me permission to
sign your name?” She told him that she did not and further that she did not
have an email indicating as much, which was the usual course of her
arrangement with [Mr. Doll]. She thought [Mr. Doll] sounded irritated and
very short. Ms. Van Burkleo said this was the first she learned that it was
[Mr. Doll] who had signed her name.

Ms. Van Burkleo was extremely concerned for her children, so [Mr.
Doll] filed a second emergency petition on her behalf. During the course of
their discussions, [Mr. Doll] told Ms. Van Burkleo that attorneys sign
documents for clients frequently and that he might get a minor reprimand
but, since the conten[t]s of the affidavit were true, there would be no harsh
punishment. [Mr. Doll] then told her during their phone conversation, “you
just say, you know, all those documents that you saw, all your signatures look
different, but that they’re all yours.” [Mr. Doll] also told her that Mr. Carter
could get in trouble and lose his job if Ms. Van Burkleo did not say that it
was her signature. Ms. Van Burkleo said that, on the day of the hearing, [Mr.
Doll] met her outside the courtroom and reminded her that Mr. Carter could
lose his job and instructed her how to testify. He never informed her that she
could get into trouble for lying under oath. Instead, he gave her the
impression that it was fine because the contents of the affidavit were in fact
true. She said that she trusted him, and she testified that all of the signatures
on the petitions, including the March 1, 2013 petition, belonged to her.

-6-
Ms. Van Burkleo said that she never went to [Mr. Doll’s] office at all
on March 1, 2013. She never signed the affidavit petition in the presence of
Mr. Carter. She agreed that she perjured herself when she said otherwise.
She had been indicted for two counts of aggravated perjury.

Id. at *6–7.

The State also offered the testimony of a handwriting expert. Id. at *7. The expert
testified: “Ms. Van Burkleo’s known signature was not similar to the one on the petition.”
Id. The expert also testified that “after examining known signatures of [Mr. Doll], it
appeared that it was [Mr. Doll] who signed Ms. Van Burkleo’s signature on the petition.”
Id.

Mr. Doll testified at his trial. Id. He explained that “he had the petition ready to go
and left it for Ms. Van Burkleo to sign. He assumed that she did so. He denied ever asking
Ms. Van Burkleo to testify that she had signed the petition or that Mr. Carter had notarized
her signature.” Id. On cross-examination, Mr. Doll acknowledged that “he told Judge
Easter at the April 23, 2013, hearing that Ms. Van Burkleo was in his office on March 1,
2013, at 3:00 p.m. to sign the emergency ex parte petition.” Id. Mr. Doll also
acknowledged that “he questioned his own client, Ms. Van Burkleo, about whether she
came to his office on March 1, 2013. Her answer resulted in her being charged with
aggravated perjury and also being prosecuted civilly for over a million dollars by” her ex-
husband. Id.

Mr. Doll claimed he was unaware of who actually signed Ms. Van Burkleo’s name
for the petition, but he conceded that “some of the ‘slants’ and ‘angles’ of his own signature
mirrored those of the signature purported to be of Ms. Van Burkleo on the petition. He
agreed that the signature on the petition did not look like any other that he had seen from
Ms. Van Burkleo.” Id.

On May 17, 2017, at the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Mr. Doll of two
counts of suborning aggravated perjury and one count of criminal simulation. Id. at *1.
The trial court sentenced him to two years of probation. Id.

Mr. Doll appealed his convictions to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.7 On
December 8, 2020, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions. Id. Mr. Doll
sought permission to appeal his convictions to this Court, which was denied. Doll, 2020
WL 7231101 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2020), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. May 13, 2021).
7
Mr. Doll appealed the timeliness of his indictment; he did not contest the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his convictions. Doll, 2020 WL 7231101, at *5.

-7-
Disciplinary Proceedings

The offenses for which Mr. Doll was convicted are Class E felonies and constitute
“serious crimes” under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 22.8 Consequently, after
the convictions, BPR Disciplinary Counsel notified the Tennessee Supreme Court of the
convictions.9 On May 31, 2017, this Court suspended Mr. Doll’s law license and referred
the matter to the Board for formal proceedings “in which the sole issue to be determined
shall be the extent of final discipline” to be imposed.10

8
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 2 defines “serious crime” as:

any felony and any other crime a necessary element of which, as determined by the
statutory or common law definition of such crime, involves improper conduct as an
attorney, interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation,
fraud, willful failure to file income tax returns, willful tax evasion, deceit, bribery,
extortion, misappropriation, theft, or an attempt or a conspiracy or solicitation of another
to commit a “serious crime.”

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 2.
9
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 22.1 provides:

(a) The clerk of any court in this state in which an attorney enters a plea of nolo
contendere or a plea of guilty to, or is found guilty by verdict of the jury or of the trial court
sitting without a jury of, a crime shall within ten days of the plea or verdict transmit a copy
thereof to the Court and to Disciplinary Counsel.

(b) Any attorney subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of this Court who has entered a
plea of nolo contendere or a plea of guilty to, or who has been found guilty by verdict of
the jury or of the trial court sitting without a jury of, any serious crime, as defined in Section
2, shall within ten days of such plea or verdict provide adequate proof of the plea or verdict,
including a copy thereof, to Disciplinary Counsel.

(c) Upon receiving notice from an attorney pursuant to Section 22.1(b) with respect to
any serious crime, as defined in Section 2, or upon otherwise being advised that an attorney
subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Court has entered a plea of nolo contendere
or a plea of guilty to, or has been found guilty by verdict of the jury or of the trial court
sitting without a jury of, any crime, Disciplinary Counsel shall obtain adequate proof of
the plea or verdict, including a copy thereof, and shall file the same with a Notice of
Submission in the Nashville office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 22.1.
10
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 22.3(c) provides:

-8-
On June 1, 2017, the Board filed a petition for final discipline against Mr. Doll, and
a hearing panel was appointed. Mr. Doll notified the BPR of his intent to appeal the
convictions, so resolution of the petition was deferred until the conclusion of Mr. Doll’s
appeals. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 22.3(c).11

Once the appeal of the underlying criminal convictions concluded, the disciplinary
proceedings resumed. The hearing panel tried the matter on November 23, 2021.

At the hearing, Mr. Doll was the only person to testify. Mr. Doll admitted to the
fact of his felony convictions, and that they all related to his actions as a practicing attorney
and occurred while he was representing a client before the court. While Mr. Doll’s counsel
emphasized that Mr. Doll acknowledged he could not challenge the convictions, he gave
context for them. For example, Mr. Doll emphasized that, at the trial on the criminal
charges, Ms. Van Burkleo was a cooperating witness with criminal charges against her,
and that she testified differently than she had testified at the show cause hearing before
Judge Easter. Mr. Doll said that his “recollection is [Ms. Van Burkleo] came in and to my
knowledge signed that document.” He said he had been paid a flat fee earlier, so he made
no money on the emergency petition, and that he had a good attorney-client relationship
with Ms. Van Burkleo until she testified against him at his criminal trial. Mr. Doll
acknowledged that, as a result of the events, Ms. Van Burkleo was charged with perjury
and sued by her former husband.

Before the hearing panel, the Board argued that the presumptive sanction was
disbarment under Standard 5.1 of the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”), based on the serious nature of the crimes of which
Mr. Doll was convicted, and the fact that they involve intentional interference with the
administration of justice, dishonesty and deceit, and soliciting another to commit those

(c) Upon the receipt of adequate proof and copies of a judgment, plea of nolo
contendere or guilty plea with respect to a serious crime, as defined in Section 2, the Court
shall, in addition to suspending the attorney in accordance with the provisions of Section
22.3(a), also refer the matter to the Board for the institution of a formal proceeding before
a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined is the extent of the final discipline
to be imposed, provided that a disciplinary proceeding so instituted will not be brought to
hearing until all appeals from the conviction are concluded.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 22.3(c).
11
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 22.3(c), states that “a disciplinary proceeding so
instituted will not be brought to hearing until all appeals from the conviction are concluded.” Tenn. Sup.
Ct. R. 9, § 22.3(c).

-9-
offenses. It emphasized that his actions took place in proceedings before a court and were
detrimental to the administration of justice. The Board pointed out Mr. Doll’s prior
disciplinary history, his substantial experience in the practice of law, his illegal conduct,
and the dishonest nature of his offenses as aggravating factors.

Counsel for Mr. Doll did not dispute the presumptive sanction under the ABA
Standards but emphasized the hearing panel’s discretion in determining the sanction. He
contended Mr. Doll had no dishonest or selfish motive, noted he had cooperated with the
BPR investigation of the matter, and argued that the prior discipline was remote from the
current convictions. Finally, arguing there is “disparity” in lawyer discipline, counsel for
Mr. Doll asked the hearing panel to compare a disciplinary case, In re Grace Ingrid
Gardiner, in which the attorney received a suspension rather than a disbarment for what he
characterized as similar misconduct.12

The Board objected to this last argument, arguing that recent Tennessee Supreme
Court cases had indicated that hearing panels were not to consider comparative cases.

The panel allowed Mr. Doll’s attorney to argue the Gardiner case and took the
matter under advisement.13

On December 1, 2021, the hearing panel issued its decision. The panel found the
Board had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Doll was convicted of three
criminal offenses, including two acts of subornation of aggravated perjury and criminal
simulation, all of which are felonies and constitute serious crimes.

To determine the sanction, the hearing panel then looked to the ABA Standards.
The panel found applicable Standards 5.1 and 5.11,14 which identify disbarment as the
12
Counsel for Mr. Doll cited In re Grace Ingrid Gardiner from the BPR press release as BPR
Number 23269, a disciplinary matter that apparently was not appealed.
13
Counsel for Mr. Doll argued that the misconduct in Gardiner was similar to that of Mr. Doll,
including presenting to a bankruptcy court a document with a forged signature, but the sanction imposed
was three years of suspension, with four months active suspension and the remainder on probation. The
Board responded that, if the panel chose to consider comparative cases, Gardiner was distinguishable
because the attorney in that case was not convicted of a crime.
14
ABA Standard 5.11 states:

5.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when:

(a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct a necessary element of which includes
intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing,

- 10 -
presumptive sanction “when a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct a necessary
element of which includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, and solicitation of another to commit any of these
offenses.” The hearing panel also found applicable Standards 7.0 and 7.1,15 because Mr.
Doll “violated his duties owed as a professional by knowingly engaging in conduct with
the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causing serious or potentially
serious injury to a client.” These ABA Standards also identify disbarment as the
presumptive sanction.

The panel found five aggravating factors. The first was prior discipline; the panel
found that the Board had shown Mr. Doll had a September 19, 2011 private informal
admonition, an April 14, 2014 public censure, and a September 20, 2018 ninety-day
summary suspension. The second aggravating factor was Mr. Doll’s dishonest and selfish
motives. The third was Mr. Doll’s refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of
misconduct, and the fourth was Mr. Doll’s substantial experience in the practice of law.
The fifth aggravating factor was Mr. Doll’s illegal conduct, consisting of the three felony
convictions, including two for subornation of aggravated perjury.

The hearing panel found one mitigating factor, Mr. Doll’s cooperative attitude in
the disciplinary proceedings.

The hearing panel’s decision considered Mr. Doll’s argument that disbarment was
not proportionate in light of a comparative case, Gardiner. The hearing panel distinguished
Gardiner, noting that the attorney in that case was neither charged nor convicted of a
criminal offense. It also acknowledged the Board’s argument that the hearing panel was
not permitted to consider comparative cases.

misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft . . . or solicitation of another
to commit any of these offenses

ABA Standard 5.11
15
ABA Standard 7.1 states:

7.1 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that
is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or
the legal system.

ABA Standard 7.1.

- 11 -
The hearing panel pointed to Mr. Doll’s convictions and said that “conviction of
such acts, particularly of acts of subornation of aggravated perjury, cuts through the very
heart of the judicial system and cannot be minimized in any way.” After cross-motions to
alter or amend, the hearing panel entered an order reaffirming its decision to disbar Mr.
Doll.16

Trial Court Review

Mr. Doll filed a petition for review of the hearing panel’s judgment in the Davidson
County Chancery Court, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 33.1(a). In
support of his argument that disbarment was a disproportionate sanction, Mr. Doll asked
the trial court to consider comparative cases, again citing the Gardiner disciplinary
decision. The trial court declined to do so. The trial court said it understood the holdings
in Meehan v. Board of Professional Responsibility of Supreme Court of Tennessee, 584
S.W.3d 403 (Tenn. 2019) and Beier v. Board of Professional Responsibility of Supreme
Court, 610 S.W.3d 425 (Tenn. 2020), to be that hearing panels and trial courts in attorney
disciplinary cases are to rely on the ABA Standards, not sanctions imposed in comparative
cases, to choose the appropriate sanction.17

On November 8, 2022, the trial court issued its memorandum opinion affirming the
judgment of the hearing panel. The trial court agreed that Standard 5.11(a) reflected the
appropriate presumptive sanction for Mr. Doll’s convictions of subornation of aggravated
perjury and criminal simulation, reasoning that “[a]ll three offenses amount to an
intentional interference with the administration of justice” and are “explicit violations of
[the] duty owed by every attorney.” Turning to the aggravating and mitigating factors, the
trial court said “there can be no serious challenge to the Panel’s conclusion that the

16
The Board filed a motion asking the hearing panel to alter its order to clarify that, in support of
its contention that the panel was not to consider comparative cases, the Board had cited Beier v. Board of
Professional Responsibility of Supreme Court, 610 S.W.3d 425, 436 (Tenn. 2020) (citing Meehan v. Board
of Professional Responsibility of Supreme Court of Tennessee, 584 S.W.3d 403, 416 (Tenn. 2019)). The
Board also contended that the panel improperly addressed Mr. Doll’s argument that the punishment of
disbarment by considering a comparative case. Mr. Doll filed a response and a petition to rehear arguing
that Beier and Meehan did not prohibit the panel from considering comparative cases in determining the
proper discipline.

On January 12, 2022, the hearing panel entered the order reaffirming its earlier decision. The panel
distinguished Beier because the attorney in that case was not convicted of a crime. In support of its decision
to disbar Mr. Doll, the panel cited Meehan, in which the attorney was convicted of a serious crime, and this
Court affirmed disbarment as the sanction.
17
The trial judge commented that he had been the trial judge in both Meehan and Beier and was
well familiar with them.

- 12 -
aggravating factors far outweigh the single mitigating factor.” It affirmed disbarment as
the appropriate sanction for Mr. Doll.

Mr. Doll now appeals to this Court under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section
33.1(d).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court oversees the practice of law in this State in exercise of the authority
vested in it by the Tennessee Constitution. Beier, 610 S.W.3d at 435–36 (Tenn. 2020)
(citing Tenn. Const. art. II, § 1; Tenn. Const. art. II, § 2; Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 1).
“Accordingly, when we are called upon to review judgments in disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, we do so in light of our fundamental and inherent power to promulgate,
administer, and enforce the rules governing the licensing and professional conduct of
lawyers practicing in Tennessee.” Talley v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 358 S.W.3d 185, 190 (Tenn.
2011). When an attorney or the Board seeks judicial review of the hearing panel’s decision,
the trial court’s “review shall be on the transcript of the evidence before the hearing panel
and its findings and judgment.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(b). The trial court may:

reverse or modify the decision if the rights of the party filing the Petition for
Review have been prejudiced because the hearing panel’s findings,
inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (1) in violation of constitutional or
statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the hearing panel’s jurisdiction; (3)
made upon unlawful procedure; (4) arbitrary or capricious or characterized
by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or (5)
unsupported by evidence which is both substantial and material in the light
of the entire record.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(b). Subsection (d) addresses appeals to the Tennessee Supreme
Court.

Either party dissatisfied with the decree of the circuit or chancery court may
prosecute an appeal directly to the Court. The appeal shall be determined
upon the transcript of the record from the circuit or chancery court, which
shall include the transcript of evidence before the hearing panel, and upon
the parties’ briefs but without oral argument, unless the Court orders
otherwise.

- 13 -
Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(d). In all, this Court “bear[s] ultimate responsibility for
enforcing the rules governing our profession. Beier, 610 S.W.3d at 437 (quoting Mabry v.
Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Supreme Court, 458 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tenn. 2014).

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Mr. Doll argues that BPR hearing panels have the authority to review
comparative discipline, i.e. prior disciplinary cases involving similar circumstances, to
determine the proper sanction in a given case. In the alternative, he argues that, under this
Court’s review, suspension rather than disbarment is the appropriate sanction for Mr. Doll.
We consider both issues in turn.

Hearing Panel Review

Mr. Doll argues first that, in deciding the recommended sanction in a disciplinary
matter, BPR hearing panels may review comparative discipline, i.e. prior disciplinary
decisions involving similar circumstances. Indeed, Mr. Doll asserts that a hearing panel
would abuse its discretion by declining to review such comparative discipline.

We respectfully disagree. In attorney disciplinary cases, BPR hearing panels derive
their authority from Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9. Section
15.4 of Rule 9 provides: “In determining the appropriate type of discipline, the hearing
panel shall consider the applicable provisions of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(a). Rule 9 does not provide authority for either
hearing panels or trial courts to base recommended attorney disciplinary sanctions on a
review of sanctions imposed in comparative cases:

Under Rule 9, a hearing panel is directed to consider the applicable
provisions of the ABA Standards to determine the appropriate sanction in a
particular case. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(a). There is no authority under
Rule 9 for a hearing panel to base its recommended sanction on a review of
sanctions imposed in similar cases. In addition, a trial court’s authority to
reverse or modify a hearing panel’s decision is limited to the five grounds
listed in Section 33.1(b). Inconsistency with sanctions in similar cases is not
a listed ground.

Meehan, 584 S.W.3d at 416. The holding in Meehan was emphasized later in Beier, in
which the Court said that “neither BPR hearing panels nor reviewing trial courts are

- 14 -
authorized to base a recommended sanction on a review of sanctions imposed in
comparative cases.” 610 S.W.3d at 436–37. The Beier Court clarified:

The chancery court based its conclusion on the appropriate sanction in part
on a comparative analysis, that is, a review of similar cases to determine the
appropriate sanction. As noted above, this Court recently held that, while
hearing panels and trial courts must consider the applicable provisions of the
ABA Standards to determine the appropriate sanction in a particular case,
“[t]here is no authority under Rule 9 for a hearing panel to base its
recommended sanction on a review of sanctions imposed in similar cases.”
Meehan, 584 S.W.3d at 416 (citing Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(a)).
Moreover, “a trial court’s authority to reverse or modify a hearing panel’s
decision is limited to the five grounds listed in Section 33.1(b).
Inconsistency with sanctions in similar cases is not a listed ground.” Id.
Thus, reviewing trial courts are not authorized to base a recommended
sanction on a review of sanctions imposed in comparative cases. Our opinion
in Meehan, however, was issued after the chancery court’s decision in this
case, so the chancery court could not have been aware of it when the ruling
was made.

Beier, 610 S.W.3d at 448 n.23. Thus, this Court stated in both Meehan and Beier that Rule
9 does not authorize either hearing panels or trial courts to base recommended attorney
disciplinary sanctions on a review of sanctions imposed in comparative cases.

Despite the language in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9 and the Court’s directive
in Meehan and Beier, Mr. Doll urges us to permit hearing panels and trial courts to utilize
comparative cases to determine the appropriate sanction in attorney disciplinary cases.
Doing so, he argues, would promote uniformity of punishment and align attorney
disciplinary proceedings with current practices for mitigating a defendant’s sentence in
criminal cases.18

18
Mr. Doll points to the United States Sentencing Guidelines applicable in federal criminal
proceedings, which permit a criminal defendant to cite analogous cases to mitigate his sentence. He argues
that disciplinary hearing panel proceedings are similar.

We have repeatedly rejected similar attempts to liken attorney disciplinary proceedings to criminal
proceedings. “As this Court has repeatedly held, attorney disciplinary proceedings are not criminal
proceedings.” Harris v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 645 S.W.3d 125, 136 (Tenn. 2022) (citing
cases).

- 15 -
We decline to do so. The omission in Rule 9 of authority for hearing panels and
trial courts to consider comparative cases is intentional, not inadvertent. The Court recently
explained the centrality of the ABA Standards to achieving uniformity of punishment in
attorney discipline:

Regardless of comparative cases, . . . the primary tool for determining
appropriate and consistent sanctions for attorney misconduct is the ABA
Standards. The Standards themselves state their purpose:

The Standards constitute a model, setting forth a
comprehensive system for determining sanctions, permitting
flexibility and creativity in assigning sanctions in particular
cases of lawyer misconduct. They are designed to promote: (1)
consideration of all factors relevant to imposing the
appropriate level of sanction in an individual case; (2)
consideration of the appropriate weight of such factors in light
of the stated goals of lawyer discipline; (3) consistency in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the same or similar
offenses within and among jurisdictions.

ABA Standard 1.3 (“Purpose of These Standards”). Thus, the ABA
Standards were designed to promote consistency in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions. “Use of the ABA Standards will further the goal of
our disciplinary system because they ‘combine clear, straight-forward
guidelines which ensure a level of consistency necessary for fairness to the
public and the legal system with the flexibility and creativity essential to
secure justice to the disciplined lawyer.” Grievance Adm’r v. Lopatin, 612
N.W.2d 120, 127 (Mich. 2000) (quoting In re Buckalew, 731 P.2d 48, 52
(Alaska 1986)). They serve as a guide to impose “a level of discipline that
takes into account the unique circumstances of the individual case, but still
falls within broad constraints designed to ensure consistency.” Id.

Under the ABA Standards, barring unusual circumstances, once the
correct presumptive sanction is determined, that sanction generally applies
unless aggravating or mitigating factors indicate a greater or lesser sanction
is appropriate.

Manookian v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 685 S.W.3d 744, 808 (Tenn. 2024)
(some citations omitted) (cleaned up). Thus, under Rule 9, hearing panels and trial courts

- 16 -
considering attorney discipline promote consistency in the imposition of sanctions by
anchoring their decisions on punishment to the ABA Standards.

We recognize that attorney disciplinary matters are fact-intensive, and decisions on
the appropriate sanction may hinge on nuance, detail, and unique circumstances in a
particular case. See, e.g., In re Sitton, 618 S.W.3d 288, 299 (Tenn. 2021) (noting there are
“cases where the facts do not fit neatly within the ABA Standards”). For that reason, we
have emphasized that the ABA Standards “serve as ‘guideposts’ for determining the
appropriate punishment rather than ‘rigid rules that dictate a particular outcome.’” In re
Vogel, 482 S.W.3d 520, 533 (Tenn. 2016) (quoting Hyman v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct.,
437 S.W.3d 435, 447 (Tenn. 2014)).

The ABA Standards themselves “allow the application of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances to adjust the sanction imposed.”19 In re Cope, 549 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tenn.
2018) (citing ABA Standard 9.1)). The ABA Standards list of aggravating and mitigating
factors “are illustrative, not exclusive, and other factors may be considered.” In re Sitton,
618 S.W.3d at 303 (in addition to listed aggravating and mitigating factors, Court
considered as an additional aggravating circumstance that lawyer’s unethical comments
“were made in a very public setting, on social media”).

Courts have recognized that “meaningful comparisons of attorney sanction cases
are difficult as the behavior that leads to sanction varies so widely between cases.” In re
Robinson, 209 A.3d 570, 597 (Vt. 2019) (quoting In re Strouse, 34 A.3d 329, 340 (Vt.
2011) (Dooley, J., dissenting)). Tethering the disciplinary decisions of hearing panels and
trial courts to the ABA Standards is the best way to afford them the flexibility needed to
account for the unique circumstances in a given case, while also promoting consistency by
ensuring that the level of discipline falls within broad boundaries.

Still, our rules recognize that “[i]nconsistent sanctions, either within a jurisdiction
or among jurisdictions, cast doubt on the efficiency and the basic fairness of all disciplinary
systems.” Background, ABA Standards. To minimize the risk of such inconsistency, this
Court reviews attorney sanctions imposed across the State, even sanctions that are not
appealed. See, e.g., Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(b) (Court review where there is no appeal)
(“The Court shall review the recommended punishment provided in such judgment or
settlement with a view to attaining uniformity of punishment throughout the State and
appropriateness of punishment under the circumstances of each particular case.”); see also

19
Aggravating circumstances are defined as “any considerations or factors that may justify an
increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed.” ABA Standard 9.21. Mitigating circumstances are
defined as “any considerations or factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be
imposed.” ABA Standard 9.31.

- 17 -
Manookian, 685 S.W.3d at 807 (attorney appeal) (“For the sake of uniformity, we seek to
review the sanctions imposed in any other cases with similar circumstances.”).

Hearing panels and trial courts have ready access to the relatively few reported
opinions on disciplinary cases that are appealed, but have limited access to and familiarity
with the greater number of disciplinary decisions that are not appealed. Moreover,
unappealed disciplinary decisions not reflected in court opinions, such as the Gardiner case
cited repeatedly by Mr. Doll, may reflect a lesser discipline for reasons that are not apparent
from press releases or summaries, such as proof or witness problems after investigation,
TLAP referrals, and the like, but which are often revealed to this Court in documents filed
to aid our review of the discipline. Thus, the Supreme Court’s more expansive perspective
from seeing the broad swath of attorney disciplinary matters in the entirety of the State—
whether appealed or not— puts it in the best position to appropriately consider comparative
cases for the purpose of ensuring uniformity of punishment throughout Tennessee.

For these reasons, we decline Mr. Doll’s invitation to interpret Tennessee Supreme
Court Rule 9 as authorizing hearing panels and trial courts determining attorney discipline
to consider comparative cases in addition to applying the ABA Standards.

2. Supreme Court Review

We next review the sanction recommended by the hearing panel and affirmed by
the trial court. Here, the hearing panel identified disbarment as the appropriate presumptive
sanction under ABA Standards 5.11 and 7.1 and found five aggravating and one mitigating
factor applicable. The trial court agreed with this analysis.

We agree that disbarment under ABA Standards 5.11(a) and 7.1 is the appropriate
presumptive sanction for Mr. Doll’s convictions of subornation of aggravated perjury and
criminal simulation. As stated by the trial court, all three criminal convictions “amount to
an intentional interference with the administration of justice” and “are explicit violations
of dut[ies] owed by every attorney.”

The hearing panel identified five aggravating factors: (1) prior discipline; (2)
dishonest and selfish motives; (3) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the
misconduct; (4) substantial experience in the practice of law; and (5) the nature of the
illegal conduct. It identified one mitigating factor, Mr. Doll’s cooperative attitude in the
disciplinary proceedings. We agree that all of these factors are applicable, and we agree
with the trial court that the five aggravating factors “far outweigh the single mitigating
factor.” Thus, the hearing panel applied the appropriate ABA Standards and the
aggravating and mitigating factors.

- 18 -
Mr. Doll does not dispute these findings. Instead, Mr. Doll notes that the ABA
Standards are guidelines, not mandates, and he asks this Court to conduct its own
comparative analysis and find suspension, not disbarment, to be the appropriate sanction
for Mr. Doll.

In response, the Board argues that this Court should not undertake a review of
comparative discipline unless we first determine that the hearing panel chose to apply
incorrect ABA Standards. The Board points to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section
15.4(b), which applies when neither party appeals the sanction. Rule 15.4(b) states that
this Court “review[s] the recommended punishment provided in such judgment[s] . . . with
a view to attaining uniformity of punishment throughout the State and appropriateness of
punishment under the circumstances of each particular case.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, §
15.4(b). Because this case was appealed under Section 33, the Board says this Court’s
review is under the same standard of review as the trial court, citing Board of Professional
Responsibility v. Reguli, 489 S.W.3d 408, 417 (Tenn. 2015). The Board posits that there
“is no basis for the Court to conduct a proportionality review of the sanction in this case,
absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court or the hearing panel.”

We respectfully disagree. This Court is the “final and ultimate arbiter of the
propriety of the professional conduct of all lawyers practicing in Tennessee.” Talley, 358
S.W.3d at 190. The Court “reviews disciplinary judgments in light of our ‘inherent power
. . . and fundamental right to prescribe and administer rules pertaining to the licensing and
admission of attorneys.’” Sneed v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct., 301 S.W.3d 603, 612
(Tenn. 2010) (quoting In re Burson, 909 S.W.2d 768, 773 (Tenn. 1995)). Nothing in our
Rules precludes the Court from reviewing comparative cases on appeal.

Moreover, the Board’s argument overlooks our precedent. In prior cases in which
a party has appealed to this Court, we have said that, “[i]n reviewing the punishment
appropriate for an offense, it is also appropriate to consider sanctions imposed in cases with
similar facts.” Lockett v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 380 S.W.3d 19, 29 (Tenn. 2012); see also Bd.
of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct. of Tenn. v. Maddux, 148 S.W.3d 37, 40 (Tenn. 2004); Milligan v.
Bd. of Pro. Resp. of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 166 S.W.3d 665, 673 (Tenn. 2005). This is true
even where the hearing panel applied the appropriate ABA Standards and their application
of the standards and aggravating and mitigating factors was supported by substantial and
material evidence. See Hanzelik v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct., 380 S.W.3d 669, 682
(Tenn. 2012); Bailey v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 441 S.W.3d 223, 236 (Tenn. 2014). In all, we
decline to constrain our appellate review in the manner suggested by the Board.

- 19 -
Mr. Doll first asks us to compare his conduct to the attorney in In re Grace Ingrid
Gardiner, which he obtained from a BPR press release on the attorney’s discipline.20 Both
the hearing panel and the trial court were correct in observing that, unlike Mr. Doll, the
attorney in Gardiner was not convicted of a crime.

Mr. Doll compares his conduct to cases where he says a suspension was imposed
even though the attorneys were convicted of felony offenses, citing Lockett, 380 S.W.3d
19; In re Cope, 549 S.W.3d 71; Order, In re Ford, BPR #14312, No. M2016-01035-SC-
BAR-BP (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2016); and Order, In re Temple, BPR #26096, No. M2015-01280-
SC-BAR-BP (Tenn. June 27, 2016).

As noted in In re Cope, in cases where an attorney was convicted of a felony,
“almost all of the attorneys were disbarred.” 549 S.W.3d at 75. In the few cases where the
attorney received a suspension instead of disbarment, there were significant differences
from the facts in Mr. Doll’s case.

First, in those cases, none of the attorneys had three felony convictions. See In re
Cope, 549 S.W.3d at 72, 76 (one felony conviction for insider trading involving fraud and
deceit); Order, In re Ford, BPR #14312, No. M2016-01035-SC-BAR-BP (Tenn. Dec. 22,
2016) (theft over $1,000); Order, In re Temple, BPR #26096, No. M2015-01280-SC-BAR-
BP (Tenn. June 27, 2016) (one attempted criminal usury conviction); Lockett, 380 S.W.3d
at 22 (state court conviction of felony theft and federal court conviction of willful failure
to file tax returns).

Second, in the Cope opinion, the Court acknowledged that disbarment was the
presumptive sanction, but pointed out that the attorney “had no other disciplinary actions
in his career, his criminal conduct was atypical, and his conduct did not injure his clients.”
In re Cope, 549 S.W.3d at 76. The same cannot be said of Mr. Doll. He has had three
prior disciplinary actions, and his three felony convictions were directly related to his use
of his law license. See In re Robinson, 209 A.3d at 597 (noting that prior case law did not
support departing from the presumptive sanction of disbarment because in prior cases
where criminal conduct resulted in suspension “the criminal conduct was not directly
related to the [attorneys’] use of their law licenses.”).

20
For the reasons we noted above, cases that are not reflected in an opinion by this Court are less
helpful than published opinions in a proportionality review. Press releases and summaries of these cases
may not reflect things like proof or witness issues, nuance and detail that can be important in comparing
one case to another.

- 20 -
Significantly, Mr. Doll cannot claim that his conduct did not injure his client. The
details about Mr. Doll’s misconduct and his defense in his disciplinary hearing show why
his conduct toward his client was particularly egregious.

Here, the proof in Mr. Doll’s criminal case, apparently credited by the jury, showed
that Ms. Van Burkleo was at her workplace when the fake signature was placed on the oath
for the emergency petition and notarized. The proof indicated that Mr. Doll himself put
the signature on the document.

The proof also showed that, after Ms. Van Burkleo testified that she did not sign the
petition, at the next hearing, Mr. Doll told Judge Easter “that Ms. Van Burkleo was in his
office the day that the petition was signed.” Doll, 2020 WL 7231101, at *5. At the next
hearing, Mr. Doll embellished this untruth and told Judge Easter that his calendar showed
he prepared the emergency petition on March 1, 2013, “two hours before Ms. Van Burkleo
arrived in his office at 3:00 p.m. to review and sign the documents.” Id. at *6.

Not content with his own prevarication to hide his misconduct, the proof at the
criminal trial showed Mr. Doll proceeded to coach Ms. Van Burkleo into lying in open
court. Ms. Van Burkleo testified that Mr. Doll called her and, in an irritated and short
manner, said “don’t you remember giving me permission to sign your name?” Id. She
responded that she did not. Id. He minimized his misconduct, telling her that “attorneys
sign documents for clients frequently and that he might get a minor reprimand but, since
the conten[t]s of the affidavit were true, there would be no harsh punishment.” Id. Mr.
Doll went on to instruct her, at the hearing, “you just say, you know, all those documents
that you saw, all your signatures look different, but that they’re all yours.” Id. He warned
her that, if she did not repeat that lie, Mr. Carter “could get in trouble and lose his job.” Id.

Ms. Van Burkleo testified at the criminal trial that, the day of the show cause hearing
before Judge Easter, Mr. Doll met her outside the courtroom “and reminded her that Mr.
Carter could lose his job and instructed her how to testify.” Id. Mr. Doll never disclosed
to Ms. Van Burkleo that he was coaching her to commit a criminal offense; instead he led
her to believe “it was fine because the contents of the affidavit were in fact true.” Id. Ms.
Van Burkleo dutifully followed Mr. Doll’s instructions, and ended up being charged with
criminal offenses for the conduct he urged upon her.

Thus, it is undisputed that the jury in the criminal case credited testimony showing
that Mr. Doll took advantage of the trust his client placed in him and pressured her into
lying in court, all in order to shield Mr. Doll from the fallout of his actions. This course of
action resulted in disastrous consequences for Mr. Doll’s client.

- 21 -
The record also supports the hearing panel’s finding, as an aggravating factor, that
Mr. Doll refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct. True enough,
after his conviction for subornation of aggravated perjury, Mr. Doll conceded he could not
dispute the underlying criminal convictions and acknowledged they all related to his
actions as a practicing attorney. He acknowledged that Ms. Van Burkleo was charged with
perjury and sued by her former husband. But instead of recognizing that these
consequences were caused by his choices and actions, Mr. Doll continued to maintain that
Ms. Van Burkleo in fact signed the oath on the emergency petition,21 and he insinuated that
the real problem was Ms. Van Burkleo’s choice to testify untruthfully that she did not.22
He apparently viewed himself as a victim of the contentious nature of post-divorce
litigation: “You know, if I could add, domestic attorneys who did this a little longer than
me and who are a lot wiser than me advised me don’t handle post divorce matters. I wish
I’d listened.” Mr. Doll’s continuing “claim [that] this is all just a gross misunderstanding
. . . is not taking responsibility.” In re Sitton, 618 S.W.3d at 303.

As emphasized by the hearing panel below, Mr. Doll’s conduct in this case,
particularly his subornation of aggravated perjury, “cuts through the very heart of the
judicial system and cannot be minimized in any way.” We agree with the hearing panel
and the trial court that disbarment, rather than suspension, is the appropriate sanction for
Mr. Doll.

For those reasons, we affirm the chancery court’s affirmation of the hearing panel’s
sanction of disbarment, effective upon entry of this Court’s order under Tennessee
Supreme Court Rule 9, section 28.1.23

21
In his testimony, Mr. Doll maintained that his “recollection is [Ms. Van Burkleo] came in and to
my knowledge signed that document.”
22
Mr. Doll testified that his relationship with Ms. Van Burkleo was good and “there was really no
conflict between the two of us until she testified at trial” that she did not sign the oath on the emergency
petition.
23
At the Board’s suggestion, the hearing panel’s initial order recommended Mr. Doll be disbarred
retroactive to the date of his summary suspension on May 31, 2017. The Board later asked the panel to
strike the retroactivity language. The panel’s modified order did not modify the retroactivity language. In
its brief to this Court, the Board asks us to fix the retroactivity language.

Under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 28.1, Mr. Doll’s disbarment is effective upon
entry of this Court’s order. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 28.1. During Mr. Doll’s appeals of his criminal
conviction, this Court amended Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 30.2 to provide: “Individuals
disbarred under Rule 9 prior to July 1, 2020, may not apply for reinstatement until the expiration of at least
five years from the effective date of the disbarment.” That order also amended Tennessee Supreme Court
Rule 9, section 30.4(d) to state: “Individuals disbarred on or after July 1, 2020, are not eligible for

- 22 -
CONCLUSION

We hold the trial court’s decision upholding the hearing panel’s sanction of
disbarment was neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the chancery court and the decision of the hearing panel to disbar Mr. Doll
from the practice of law in the State of Tennessee. Mr. Doll’s disbarment shall be effective
upon entry of this Court’s order under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 28.1. The
costs of this appeal are taxed to Robert Allen Doll, III and his surety, for which execution
may issue if necessary.

_________________________________
HOLLY KIRBY, CHIEF JUSTICE

reinstatement.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 30.4(d). These amendments took “effect immediately” upon the
filing of the January 23, 2020 order.

The petition for discipline against Mr. Doll was filed on June 1, 2017, but because of the intervening
criminal proceedings and appeals, the hearing panel decision recommending disbarment was not issued
until December 1, 2021. Therefore, Mr. Doll is subject to the July 1, 2020 rule change making disbarment
permanent.

- 23 -

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