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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
11/30/2022
IN RE: JUSTIN GREY WOODWARD, BPR No. 026709
An Attorney Licensed to Practice Law in Tennessee
(Hamilton County)
________________________________
No. M2022-01486-SC-BAR-BP
BOPR No. 2022-3288-3-AW-25
_______________________________
ORDER OF RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE
This matter is before the Court pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 25, upon a Notice
of Submission filed by the Board of Professional Responsibility (âBoardâ) consisting of a
certified copy of a per curiam opinion entered by the Supreme Court of Georgia on January
19, 2022, imposing a public reprimand on Justin Grey Woodward. (Exhibit A).
On October 21, 2022, this Court entered a Notice of Reciprocal Discipline requiring
Mr. Woodward to inform this Court within thirty (30) days of receipt of the Notice why
reciprocal discipline should not be imposed in Tennessee pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9,
§ 25.4, or, in the absence of a response demonstrating the grounds set forth in Tenn. Sup.
Ct. R. 9, § 25.4, the Supreme Court of Tennessee will impose a similar discipline with
identical terms and conditions based upon the Public Reprimand issued by the Supreme
Court of Georgia. This Court received no response from Mr. Woodward.
After careful consideration of the record in this matter, the Court finds, based upon
the particular facts of this case, that none of the elements in Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 25.4
exist. Accordingly, it is appropriate to enter an Order of Reciprocal Discipline imposing a
public reprimand upon Mr. Woodward.
IT IS, THEREFORE, CONSIDERED, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED BY THE COURT THAT:
(1)
Justin Grey Woodward is hereby publicly reprimanded.
(2)
Pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 28.1, this Order shall be effective upon
entry.
(3)
The Board of Professional Responsibility shall cause notice of this discipline
to be published as required by Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 28.11.
PER CURIAM
$uprente (grrurt
c tate ffieorsia
NATHAN DEAL JUDICIAL CENTER
cAtiztrttrt 30334
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA
CLERK'S OFFICE, ATLANTA
September 21,2022
I, Therese "Tee" Barnes, Clerk, of the Supreme Court of Georgia, do hereby certify that
the foregoing Opinion, hereto attached, is a true and correct copy, in the Supreme Court of
Georgia Case No. S22Y0331, as appears from the records and files in this office.
Witness my signature and the seal of this Courl hereto
affixed the day and year first above written.
d
41erk
.
4264011.46"
4 31
0/
1
2
2
i 9 1.474.111. 4
°
Exhibit A
313 Ga. 112
FINAL COPY
S22Y0331: IN THE MATTER OF JUSTIN GREY WOODWARD.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary rnatter is before the Court on the petition -for
voluntary ,discipline filed by Respondent Justin Grey Woodward
(State Bar No. 529774) before.the issuance of a formal complaint.
Se.e Bar Rule 4-227 (b). Woodward seeks the imposition,of discipline
for conduct'involving three separate rnatters, and he requests a
State Disciplinary Review Board reprimand or a public reprimand.
The State Bar has responded, indicating- that .it does not oppose
Woodward's petition. We agree to accept the petition and impose a
public reprimand.
With regard to State ,Disciplinary Board ("SDW).Docket No.
7421, Woodward, who has been licensed to practice,law in Georgia
since 2007, admits th.at a couple hired hirn :in September 2014 to
represent them in a dispute with their:general contractor, who had
placed a lien ,on their home; that the couple paid him for the
representation; that he filed a lawsuit on their behalf on July 20,
2015; that he'failed to "timely or adequately" respond to the clients'
requests for information and updates on their case; and that he
failed to "adequately consult with [them] about the case and how to
accomplish the objectives for which they retained [him]." According
to Woodward, the case was tried in April 2018, and a judgment was
entered against his clients for approximately $51,000 plus interest
and costs. After the trial, the clients contacted Woodward several
times to discuss how best to proceed, but Woodward admits that he
failed to "timely and adequately respon& to their requests.
With regard to SDB Docket Nos. 7422 and 7423, Woodward
admits that, at all relevant times, he maintained an IOLTA trust
account; that on July 23, 2018, when implementing a one-time
transfer of $500 in earned fees from that account into his operating
account, he "inadvertently set the transfer to be a recurring weekly
transfee; that the following week, the inadvertent recurring
transfer caused an overdraft in his trust account; and that he later
deposited money to resolve the overdraft. The following year, in
2
April 2019, a check was presented for payment against his trust
account, but the account balance was insufficient to cover the check.
With regard to the 2019 incident, Woodward asserts that he
"believed that [a] PayPal transaction payment from the client had
already processed," whereas the "PayPal transaction did not process
until after the check was presented." Woodward once again
deposited funds into the trust account to resolve the overdraft.
Based on those facts, Woodward admits that, in SDB Docket
No. 7421, he violated Rules 1.2 (a) and 1.4 of the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct.1 He explains that, during his representation
of those clients, he was "called away for military obligations," which
caused some delays in the trial. Nevertheless, he admits that his
communication with his clients "should have been more frequent
a
Rule 1.2 (a) provides, in relevant part, that "a lawyer shall abide by
as
and,
client's decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representation
by which
required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means
they are to be pursued."
bly
Rule 1.4 provides, in relevant part, that "a lawyer shall . . . reasona
to
are
ves
consult with the client about the means by which the client's objecti
status of the
be accomplished";"keep the client reasonably informed about the
tion[1"
rnatter"; and "promptly comply with reasonable requests for informa
3
and thorough," and he asserts that, in an effort to rectify any harm
he caused, he has refunded to the clients half of the attorney fees
they paid to him, less the costs for filing and serving process in the
case.
With regard to SDB Docket Nos. 7422 and 7423, Woodward
admits that he violated Rules 1.15 (I) (a) and 1.15 (II) (b).2 He
explains that both of these transactions involved "payment systems
[that he] was not as competent in as [h ]should have been"; that he
1
2 Rule 1.15 (I)(a) provides, in relevant part, that "[a] lawyer shall hold
funds or other property of clients or third persons that are in a lawyer's
possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own
funds or other property."
Rule 1.15 (II)(b) provides:
No personal funds shall ever be deposited in a lawyer's trust
account, except that unearned attorney's fees may be so held until
the same are earned. Sufficient personal funds of the lawyer may
be kept in the trust account to cover maintenance fees such as
service charges on the account. Records on such trust accounts
shall be so kept and maintained as to reflect at all times the exact
balance held for each client or third person. No funds shall be
withdrawn from such trust accounts for the personal use of the
lawyer maintaining the account except earned lawyer's fees
debited against the account of a specific client and recorded as
such.
4
"immediately" sought to rectify the overdrafts in his trust account;
and that he has instituted new procedures to ensure more reliability
in those types of transactions. Woodward also states that, in 2019,
he was assisting with the care of his father, who was hospitalized
for several months in Florida and Puerto Rico, and while those
circumstances did not excuse his actions, "they did take away from
[his] attentiveness during that period."
Woodward acknowledges that the maximum penalty for a
single violation of Rules 1.2, 1.15 (I) (a), and 1.15 (II) (b) is
disbarment.3
Citing
9.32 of the
Standard
American
Bar
Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("ABA
Standards"), however, Woodward asserts in mitigation that he
lacked a selfish or dishonest motive, is remorseful, and has no prior
disciplinary record in Georgia. See In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga.
652, 653(470 SE2d 232)(1996)(stating that this Court looks to the
ABA
Standards
for
guidance
in
determining
3 The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.4 is a
5
appropriate
public reprimand.
disciplinary sanction). At the same time, Woodward admits that, on
April 11, 2019, he received a "Public Censure from the Board of
Professional Responsibility of the Tennessee Supreme Court for
violations of Rule 1.7 (a) (2)"4 and that the discipline imposed by
Tennessee may be considered in aggravation of discipline to be
imposed in this proceeding. See Bar Rule 9.4 (b) (6). Finally,
Woodward generally asserts that he is currently deployed abroad as
part of his military service; that he has "proudly served" in the Army
for 23 years; that he "overwhelmingly" has been able to "manage the
demands of the military with [his] law practice"; that he
Woodward does not provide a record of his disciplinary proceedings in
Tennessee. Rule 1.7 (a) (2) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct
provides, in relevant part:
[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of
interest exists if . . . there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a
third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
The analogous rule in Georgia is Rule 1.7 (a), which provides, in relevant part:
A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client
if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests or the
lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person
will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client
4
6
understands the "seriousness of this situation"; and that he will
"take steps to improve [his] ability to meet the demands of both the
military and the legal profession."5
In its response, the State Bar does not dispute Woodward's
recitation of the facts and agrees that a reprimand is generally
appropriate where, as here, a lawyer is "negligent and does not act
with reasonable diligence in representing a client." ABA Standard
4.43. The Bar argues that the relevant mitigating factors in this case
are Woodward's lack of a dishonest or selfish motive, his "[p]ersonal
or :emotional problems," his timely and good-faith effort to make
restitution or rectify the consequences of the misconduct, his
cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and his
remorse, See ABA Standard 9.32 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (1). The Bar
identifies the following factors in aggravation of discipline:
Woodward's prior disciplinary offense (the "Public Censure in
that
managed
he has instituted new procedures to ensure that his trust account is
appropriately, we encourage Woodward to seek additional education or
instruction to ensure that he manages such accounts consistent with the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.
5 In this regard, we note that although Woodward has represented
7
Tennessee), the fact that he committed multiple offenses, and his
substantial experience in the practice of law. See ABA Standard 9.22
(a),(d), and (i).
We have reviewed the record in this case, and we agree to
accept Woodward's petition for voluntary discipline. Our conclusion
likely would have been different if there was any evidence of
additional violations or misconduct on Woodward's part, but given
the specific circumstances of this case, we believe that a public
reprimand is an adequate discipline to impose. See In the Matter of
Davis, 306 Ga. 381 (830 SE2d 734) (2019) (public reprimand for
violations of Rules 4.1, 8.4, and 1.15); In the Matter of Brown, 297
Ga. 865(778 SE2d 790)(2015)(public reprimand with conditions for
violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 1.15); In the Matter of Howard, 292
Ga. 413 (738 SE2d 89) (2013) (public reprimand for lawyer's
"technical!" violations of Rule 1.15 (II), where no harm was done to
clients). Accordingly, we hereby order that Woodward receive a
public reprimand in accordance with Bar Rules 4-102 (b)(3) and 4220 (c).
8
Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Public reprimand.
All the Justices concur.
Decided January 19, 2022.
Public reprimand.
Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, William D.
NeSmith HI, Deputy General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K.
Mittelman, Andreea N. Morrison, Assistant General Counsel State
Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.
9