Majority Opinion - E2024-00812-SC-R3-BP.pdf (2026)

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04/14/2026
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
Assigned on Briefs September 04, 2025

ELLIOTT J. SCHUCHARDT V. BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Knox County
No. 207706-3 D. Kelly Thomas, Jr., Senior Judge

No. E2024-00812-SC-R3-BP

This is an attorney discipline case. Elliott J. Schuchardt was licensed to practice law in
Tennessee in 2008. Beginning in 2019, several individuals reported Mr. Schuchardt to the
Board of Professional Responsibility. These complaints detailed conduct that implicated
the following rules of professional conduct (“RPC”): RPC 1.1 (Competence), 1.3
(Diligence), 1.4(a)–(b) (Communication), 1.5(b) (Fees), 1.7(a)(1) (Conflict of Interest),
1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 3.2 (Expediting Litigation), 3.3(a)(1)
(Candor Toward the Tribunal), 3.4(c) (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel), 4.2
(Communication with a Person Represented by Counsel), 4.4(a)(1) (Respect for the Rights
of Third Persons), 8.1(a) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 8.2(a)(2) (Judicial and
Legal Officials), 8.4(c) (Misconduct-Dishonesty/Fraud/Deceit/Misrepresentation), and
8.4(d) (Misconduct-Administration of Justice). A Hearing Panel of the Board of
Professional Responsibility found that Mr. Schuchardt violated these RPCs on forty-seven
occasions and recommended disbarment. The Knox County Chancery Court affirmed. Mr.
Schuchardt now asks us to reverse. Because ample evidence supports the decisions below,
we affirm Mr. Schuchardt’s disbarment.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(d); Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

MARY L. WAGNER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JEFFREY S. BIVINS, C.J.,
and HOLLY KIRBY, SARAH K. CAMPBELL, and DWIGHT E. TARWATER, JJ., joined.

Elliott J. Schuchardt, Knoxville, TN, Pro Se.

James W. Milam, Nashville, TN, for the appellee, Board of Professional Responsibility of
the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Attorney Elliot J. Schuchardt was licensed to practice law in Tennessee in 2008.1
After the Board of Professional Responsibility (“BPR” or “Board”) investigated and
prosecuted several ethics complaints against Mr. Schuchardt, a BPR Hearing Panel found
numerous violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct and recommended disbarment.
On appeal, the Knox County Chancery Court affirmed. We review the decisions below
and the recommendation of disbarment.

Factual Background

A. Jamie McBryar

Jamie McBryar hired Mr. Schuchardt to obtain a divorce and spousal support from
her then-spouse Janine McBryar (née Lefler).2 Ms. McBryar also sought custody over a
minor child she had co-parented with Ms. Lefler. Mr. Schuchardt filed a divorce petition
on behalf of Ms. McBryar on January 26, 2019 in Knox County Circuit Court.

Following the filing of Ms. McBryar’s divorce petition, Ms. Lefler initiated a
separate divorce action against Ms. McBryar in Knox County Chancery Court. Rather than
consolidating the two cases, Mr. Schuchardt engaged only in the action filed by Ms. Lefler.

Serious issues occurred in both lawsuits. We begin by noting issues with the first
action filed by Mr. Schuchardt. First, Mr. Schuchardt failed to include divorce as a cause
of action or to include a prayer for divorce. Second, Mr. Schuchardt failed to seek an order
restraining Ms. Lefler from taking the couple’s minor child out of the jurisdiction, but he
did request the child be returned to the jurisdiction. Third, Mr. Schuchardt failed to submit
a proposed temporary parenting plan, contrary to the court’s local rules.3 Fourth, Mr.
Schuchardt failed to include Ms. Lefler’s best-known address in the summons attached to
the complaint, despite having an Oregon address for Ms. Lefler and stating it in the
complaint. Fifth, Mr. Schuchardt neglected to effectuate service of process on Ms. Lefler,

1
Mr. Schuchardt graduated from law school in 1993 and initially practiced out of state. However,
Mr. Schuchardt was not licensed in Tennessee until 2008. See https://www.tbpr.org/attorneys/027016.
2
To avoid confusion, we will refer to Janine McBryar as Ms. Lefler.
3
See Knox Cnty., Fourth Cir. Ct. R. 15(A) (“In all actions seeking the establishment of residential
schedules and/or parenting responsibilities, the plaintiff or petitioner shall file with the complaint temporary
parenting plans agreed upon by the parties, or, if no agreement has been reached, a proposed temporary
parenting plan of the plaintiff or petitioner.”).
-2-
even after eventually obtaining her Tennessee address. Ultimately, Mr. Schuchardt
abandoned the Circuit Court case once Ms. Lefler filed her complaint in Chancery Court.

Problems also occurred with Mr. Schuchardt’s lawyering in the Chancery Court
action. First, Mr. Schuchardt violated several local rules.4 Second, Mr. Schuchardt failed
to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-14-107(b), which requires a party to
notify the Tennessee Attorney General when challenging the constitutionality of a statute.5
Finally, Mr. Schuchardt did not conduct any discovery for over six months, while Ms.
Lefler’s action was pending.

Issues also arose from Mr. Schuchardt’s communications with Ms. McBryar. Mr.
Schuchardt failed to explain and adequately communicate with Ms. McBryar regarding
their fee arrangement. Mr. Schuchardt explained to Ms. McBryar that “[t]here do not [sic]
seem to be sufficient assets to make it worthwhile to handle the case on credit[,]” and that
he would withdraw if Ms. McBryar did not pay him $1,500. This surprised Ms. McBryar.
She recalled paying Mr. Schuchardt a $500 deposit, and Mr. Schuchardt agreeing to forgo
receiving payment until Ms. McBryar received spousal support or disability benefits. Ms.
McBryar repeatedly asked Mr. Schuchardt to seek a continuance in lieu of withdrawal and
offered to pay him a small sum for that service. Mr. Schuchardt waffled. At times he
assured Ms. McBryar that he would attend the hearing, and at other times he suggested the
opposite. Lacking a straight answer from Mr. Schuchardt, Ms. McBryar contacted another
attorney to represent her at the last minute, Abby Rubenfeld.

Mr. Schuchardt did not withdraw in a responsible manner or communicate clearly
with Ms. Rubenfeld. Ms. Rubenfeld asked Mr. Schuchardt whether Ms. McBryar would
have competent counsel at the hearing. Mr. Schuchardt told Ms. Rubenfeld to “[e]nter an
appearance, if you want to get involved.” But Mr. Schuchardt also assured Ms. Rubenfeld
4
Mr. Schuchardt did not include in his response to Ms. Lefler’s complaint information required
under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. See Knox Cnty. Ch. Ct. R. 13(B)
(“Each initial pleading or motion shall set forth the information required by Rule 4 of these rules and as
required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-106. Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-201 et. seq., all filings in which the custody of a child is at issue
shall set forth in the first filing the information required by the Act and in particular by Tenn. Code Ann. §
36-6-224.”). Mr. Schuchardt did not include the required affidavit in his motion for spousal support and
interim counsel fees. See Knox Cnty. Ch. Ct. R. 13(E) (“Upon the filing of a petition or motion seeking
the modification of child support or alimony, each party shall file, no later than 5 days prior to the hearing,
an affidavit listing the assets, debts, gross monthly income and monthly living expenses of each party to
the extent known to the filing party, as well as any other relevant financial facts that the filing party desires
the Court to consider.”). Mr. Schuchardt also failed to submit a proposed parenting plan. See Knox Cnty.
Ch. Ct. R. 13(F)(ii) (“If no agreement has been reached, the defendant or respondent shall file with the
answer, the defendant’s or respondent’s proposed temporary parenting plan.”).
5
Mr. Schuchardt challenged the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-2-304,
which provides a presumption of parentage on gender-based grounds, because Ms. McBryar and Ms. Lefler
were a same-sex couple.
-3-
that he would represent Ms. McBryar “competently and effectively” at the custody hearing,
and that Ms. Rubenfeld could report him to the Board. Ultimately, Mr. Schuchardt filed a
motion to withdraw, and Ms. Rubenfeld entered a notice of appearance one day prior to
the custody hearing. In order to represent Ms. McBryar competently, Ms. Rubenfeld had
to reschedule the hearing, which delayed the case by nearly six months and further
frustrated Ms. McBryar’s attempt to obtain spousal support.

B. Bennett Hirschorn

Bennett Hirschorn, a real estate attorney licensed in Tennessee, filed a complaint
against Mr. Schuchardt with the Board in January 2020. Mr. Hirschorn represented Ann
Richards and Mary Jane Douglas, both real estate agents, in two unrelated matters.

Ms. Richards is a Knoxville-based real estate professional who hired Mr. Hirschorn
in a dispute with several of her former employees. Mr. Schuchardt previously represented
Ms. Richards, and the two also dated.

Ms. Douglas, a Nashville-based real estate professional, hired Mr. Schuchardt in
September 2019 to represent her in a medical malpractice action. At the time, Ms. Douglas
was facing eviction and Mr. Schuchardt allowed her to live in his home for $500 a month.
He also recommended that she reach out to Ms. Richards for work. This arrangement was
short lived as in October 2019, while still representing her, Mr. Schuchardt filed a detainer
action seeking to evict Ms. Douglas from his home. Ms. Douglas hired Mr. Hirschorn to
represent her in the eviction action filed against her by Mr. Schuchardt.

Seeking to gain leverage in his detainer action against Ms. Douglas, Mr. Schuchardt
called Mr. Hirschorn on October 22, 2019. Among several threats, Mr. Schuchardt
informed Mr. Hirschorn he would file a complaint against Ms. Richards with Tennessee’s
Real Estate Commission to place Ms. Richards’ “real estate license . . . in jeopardy,” by
“saying some really bad stuff.”6 However, Mr. Schuchardt stated that he would not file
this complaint if Mr. Hirschorn persuaded Ms. Douglas to vacate Mr. Schuchardt’s
property in the eviction action. This was a clear quid pro quo exchange: Mr. Schuchardt
threatened to jeopardize Ms. Richards’ career unless Mr. Hirschorn convinced Ms. Douglas
to vacate Mr. Schuchardt’s property.

Mr. Schuchardt then went a step further. Mr. Schuchardt threatened to inform the
judge presiding over Ms. Richards’ case that she had testified falsely, stating “I don’t care
if evidence is closed, I’m gonna say that Ann Richards is a liar in that letter. So, fuck you

6
We rely on “Appendix A” to the Hearing Panel’s Summary Judgment Order, which contains a
partial transcript of the recording Mr. Hirschorn made of his phone call with Mr. Schuchardt. The Hearing
Panel reviewed the audio recording and the Board’s Second Rule 56.03 Statement of Undisputed Facts in
producing the transcript. The audio recording was not made a part of the record before us.
-4-
and fuck Ann Richards.” Finally, when Mr. Hirschorn requested that Mr. Schuchardt cease
communication with Ms. Douglas, Mr. Schuchardt declined, stating “fuck that . . . [y]ou
can report me to the Board[,] I’m not going to comply with that.”

To summarize, Mr. Hirschorn alleged that Mr. Schuchardt violated several RPCs by
threatening two of Mr. Hirschorn’s clients (Ms. Douglas and Ms. Richards), taking adverse
actions against Mr. Schuchardt’s then-current client (Ms. Douglas), and communicating
with a person represented by counsel (Ms. Douglas).

C. Aaron King

On April 8, 2019, Mr. King hired Mr. Schuchardt in a divorce action and two
juvenile court proceedings. A dispute arose regarding the payment of fees. Due to
nonpayment of legal fees, Mr. Schuchardt withdrew from the divorce case and one of the
two juvenile proceedings.

Mr. King requested his case file from Mr. Schuchardt. Mr. Schuchardt refused,
claiming that he would hold the file as security until Mr. King paid his outstanding legal
fees to Mr. Schuchardt. Mr. Schuchardt’s case file was critical to a criminal case where
Mr. King was the defendant because it contained information impeaching Mr. King’s wife
in the divorce litigation. Mr. King’s attorney in the criminal matter, Robert Kurtz, also
requested the case file from Mr. Schuchardt. Mr. Schuchardt again refused. Mr. Kurtz
provided Mr. Schuchardt with a formal ethics opinion that explained it was improper for
him to hold Mr. King’s case file for security because releasing the file was “necessary to
avoid [a] materially adverse effect on the client.” Formal Ethics Op. 2015-5-160,
https://perma.cc/D9SP-TSNY. Mr. Schuchardt again refused to turn over the file and
further responded by threatening to harm Mr. King’s credibility with the criminal court.

Mr. King, through his attorney, served Mr. Schuchardt with a subpoena to produce
the file. Mr. Schuchardt moved to quash the subpoena. The criminal court denied Mr.
Schuchart’s motion to quash and then ordered Mr. Schuchardt to produce the file.7

As the dispute over the client file was unfolding, Mr. Schuchardt sued Mr. King for
breach of contract and failure to pay legal fees. At the time of filing suit, Mr. Schuchardt
was still counsel of record for Mr. King in one of his pending juvenile court cases. Mr.
Schuchardt did not effectively withdraw from his representation of Mr. King until August
of 2020, nearly six months after filing suit against Mr. King.

7
At the hearing for the motion to quash, Mr. Schuchardt represented to the court that he had
discussed the formal ethics opinion Mr. Kurtz provided with disciplinary counsel. But Ethics Counsel for
the Board, Laura Chastain, submitted an affidavit where she stated that Mr. Schuchardt had not contacted
the Board from January 26, 2006 to September 22, 2022, indicating that Mr. Schuchardt made a false
representation to the court.
-5-
D. Cherie Dunn

Mr. Schuchardt represented Cherie Dunn to contest a conservatorship petition filed
by her ex-husband in Anderson County Chancery Court.8 The couple’s son, Dustin Welsh,
has autism, and Ms. Dunn’s ex-husband believed he would require full-time care after
attaining the age of majority. Ms. Dunn hired Mr. Schuchardt to challenge the
conservatorship petition. The conservatorship hearing was initially set for September 28,
2020. Mr. Schuchardt moved for a continuance, and the hearing was reset for November
9, 2020. Mr. Schuchardt did not seek or obtain an extension to file an answer. Instead,
Mr. Schuchardt filed an answer to the petition the afternoon following the hearing.

Mr. Schuchardt does not dispute these basic facts. Rather, he denies any fault by
pointing to the logistical difficulties of the COVID-19 pandemic and his claim that the
chancellor presiding over the conservatorship petition accepted his late answer during the
hearing. Regardless of these explanations, Mr. Schuchardt’s late filing violated the court’s
local rules, which required responses to motions to be filed “no later than 48 hours prior to
the hearing on the motion.” Anderson Cnty. Loc. R. 117.02.

Moreover, Mr. Schuchardt neglected to draft the pleading as Ms. Dunn instructed.
Ms. Dunn e-mailed Mr. Schuchardt a week prior to the conservatorship hearing and asked
him whether he would file a response as required. Mr. Schuchardt assured her that he
would send her a draft of the response. After receiving the draft, Ms. Dunn sent Mr.
Schuchardt a document containing suggested edits. Mr. Schuchardt claimed that he could
not open her document. Ms. Dunn then sent him an e-mail containing a list of questions
and suggested edits. For example, the draft response misspelled “Welsh.” Ms. Dunn also
requested that Mr. Schuchardt amend the response to state that “[i]t is in the best interest
of the child for the court to consider the least restrictive alternative plan with supported
decision making plan.” The response filed shows that Mr. Schuchardt did not address all
of Ms. Dunn’s concerns. For example, the filed response still misspelled “Welsh” as
“Welsch.” Additionally, the response did not request that the court consider “the least
restrictive alternative plan with supported decision making plan.” According to Mr.
Schuchardt, he provided Ms. Dunn with a draft and was not required to include all of her
comments.9

8
To avoid confusion, we will refer to Derek Welsh as Mr. Welsh, and to the couple’s son as Mr.
Dustin Welsh.
9
Even if Mr. Schuchardt was not required to make all the edits Ms. Dunn proposed, he should have,
at a minimum, corrected the errors that Ms. Dunn noted. In addition to misspelling Welsh, Mr. Schuchardt’s
initial draft denied that Ms. Dunn’s address was correct in the petition. Ms. Dunn informed Mr. Schuchardt
that the address in the petition was her correct address, so denying it was incorrect. Instead of correcting
this error by admitting the address, Mr. Schuchardt included the denial and stated “[i]t is denied that Cherie
Dunn resides at the address in the Petition. Her correct address is __________” (blank in original).
-6-
In addition to the deficient response, another issue emerged during the disciplinary
proceedings regarding Ms. Dunn’s complaint. Mr. Schuchardt alleged that Ms. Dunn’s
son was present at the conservatorship hearing and testified. This conflicted with the
recollection of the trial court judge, the guardian ad litem, and Ms. Dunn, who all stated
that Mr. Dustin Welsh was not present at the hearing. The Board gave Mr. Schuchardt an
opportunity to retract his statement, but he declined. As an alternative, the Board offered
Mr. Schuchardt a private reprimand for this misstatement, which he also declined. Instead,
Mr. Schuchardt doubled down by engaging in abusive and wasteful discovery tactics to try
proving that an autistic child attended a hearing that he simply did not attend. For example,
Mr. Schuchardt e-mailed disciplinary counsel with the Board and stated “[b]e careful
signing a pleading. You will be . . . putting your career at risk.” In the same email, Mr.
Schuchardt stated “I have warned you. My distribution list will get progressively bigger,
if your office continues in this unethical and illegal course of conduct.”

Procedural History

A. The Hearing Panel’s Summary Judgment Order

In its Summary Judgment Order, the Hearing Panel reviewed Mr. Schuchardt’s
motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment, as well as the Board’s motion for
summary judgment. The Hearing Panel also resolved several allegations in a Sanctions
Order. In that Order, the Hearing Panel found that Mr. Schuchardt committed several rules
violations related to the Board’s prosecution of Ms. Dunn’s complaint. For example, Mr.
Schuchardt made several false representations to the Board, made several false allegations
about the Board, and threatened disciplinary counsel for the Board. Deeming these
allegations admitted, the Hearing Panel found that Mr. Schuchardt violated RPC 8.1(a)
(Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 8.2(a)(2) (Judicial and Legal Officials), 8.4(c)
(Misconduct-Dishonesty/Fraud/Deceit/Misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (Misconduct-
Administration of Justice). Then, the Hearing Panel denied Mr. Schuchardt’s motion to
dismiss, where he argued that Brady v. Maryland applied to his case. The Hearing Panel
also denied Mr. Schuchardt’s motion for summary judgment.

Finally, the Hearing Panel granted in part and denied in part10 the Board’s motion
for summary judgment. In granting summary judgment, the Hearing Panel made several
findings on different rules violations based upon the undisputed facts. First, the Hearing
Panel made the following findings related to Ms. McBryar’s complaint:

Respondent committed the following ethics violations related to his
representation of Jamie McBryar:

10
The Hearing Panel found genuine disputes of material fact related to portions of Ms. McBryar’s
complaint and portions of Mr. Hirschorn’s complaint.
-7-
a. Failing to move for an Order in the Knox County Fourth Circuit Court case
to restrain [Ms. Lefler] from taking the minor child out of the jurisdiction or,
alternatively, failing to seek an order commanding the return of the child to
the jurisdiction, in violation of RPCs 1.1 ([C]ompetence), 1.3 ([D]iligence),
and 3.2 ([E]xpediting [L]itigation);

b. Failing to take any action in the Knox County Chancery Court case to
effectuate the clear goals of his client, Jamie McBryar, in violation of RPCs
1.1 ([C]ompetence), 1.3 ([D]iligence), and 3.2 ([E]xpediting [L]itigation);

c. Failing to dispute, in his Answer to [Ms. Lefler’s] Chancery Court
Complaint, the specified “Number of Children: 0” in the “STATISTICAL
DATA” section of the complaint, in violation of RPC 1.1 ([C]ompetence);

d. Failing to submit a proposed temporary parenting plan with the Answer as
required by . . . Local Rule 13(F)(ii) of the Knox County Chancery Court, in
violation of RPC 1.1 ([C]ompetence);

e. Failing to file an Affidavit in support of Respondent’s Motion for Spousal
Support and Interim Counsel Fees, listing the assets, debts, gross monthly
income, and monthly living expenses of each party to the extent known by
the filing party, as required by Local Rule 13(E) of the Knox County
Chancery Court, in violation of RPC 1.1 ([C]ompetence);

f. Seeking only a determination that Jamie McBryar is the “lawful parent” of
the minor at issue, and failing to seek actual “custody” in the prayer for relief
in his Motion for Custody Order, in violation of RPC 1.1 ([C]ompetence);[11]

g. Failing to provide the statutory notice to the Tennessee Attorney General,
as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14-107(b), because the Motion for
Custody Order challenges the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-
304, in violation of RPC 1.1 ([C]ompetence);

h. Failing to conduct any discovery on behalf of Jamie McBryar client as to
the substantive issues in the Chancery Court case while the case was pending

11
The Hearing Panel found no genuine issue of material fact as to “whether [Mr. Schuchardt] failed
to dispute, in his Answer to [Ms. Lefler’s] Chancery Court complaint, the number of children in the
‘Statistical Data’ section.” As stated, this is factually accurate. However, it is also incomplete. While it is
true that Mr. Schuchardt did not dispute the number of children in that specific section, his answer included
a counter-complaint that stated “[t]he parties have one minor child.” To be sure, a better practice would
have been for Mr. Schuchardt to include this statement in his answer, rather than his counter-complaint
section. But for the purpose of this case, we disagree with the Hearing Panel’s finding that there was no
genuine dispute of material fact on this issue.
-8-
for over six (6) months, in violation of RPCs 1.3 ([D]iligence), and 3.2
([E]xpediting [L]itigation);

i. Failing to explain adequately or communicate fully the fee arrangement
with Jamie McBryar, in violation of RPCs 1.4(a)-(b) ([C]ommunication) and
1.5(b) ([F]ees);

j. Failing to keep his client informed as to the status of the fees that had been
incurred, in violation of RPCs 1.4(a)-(b) ([C]ommunication) and 1.5(b)
([F]ees);

k. Failing to cooperate with successor counsel, Abby Rubenfeld, in violation
of RPC 1.16(d)(3) ([D]eclining or [T]erminating [R]epresentation);

l. Improperly withholding Ms. McBryar’s client file from Ms. McBryar and
Ms. Rubenfeld, in violation of RPC 1.16(d)(5) ([D]eclining or [T]erminating
[R]epresentation); and

m. Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in
violation of RPC 8.4(d).

Second, the Hearing Panel made the following findings related to Mr. Hirschorn’s
complaint:

Respondent also committed the following ethics violations relating to the
Hirschhorn complaint:

a. Creating a concurrent conflict of interest between himself and his client,
Mary Jane Douglas, by filing a detainer action against Ms. Douglas while
simultaneously having an attorney-client relationship regarding her medical
malpractice claim, in violation of RPC 1.7(a)(1) ([C]onflict of [I]nterest);

b. During a 10/22/19 telephone call with Informant Hirschorn, refusing to
refrain from communicating directly with Mary Jane Douglas (Hirschhorn’s
client) regarding the detainer action, in violation of RPC 4.2
([C]ommunication with a [P]erson [R]epresented by [C]ounsel);

c. Communicating to Informant Hirschhorn threats (i) to file a complaint with
the Tennessee Real Estate Commission against Ann Richards (another client
of Hirschhorn’s in a matter wholly unrelated to the detainer action against
Ms. Douglas) and (ii) to correspond with the presiding judge of Ms.
Richards’ unrelated case against Bruce Klassen to persuade the judge that
Ms. Richards is dishonest, unless a “quid pro quo” could be reached with

-9-
respect to Respondent’s detainer action against Ms. Douglas, in violation of
RPC 4.4(a)(1) ([R]espect for the [R]ights of [T]hird [P]ersons);

d. Communicating to Informant Hirschhorn his intention to “threaten” Ms.
Douglas with adverse action against her real estate license unless a “quid pro
quo” could be reached with respect to Respondent's detainer action against
Ms. Douglas, in violation of RPC 4.4(a)(1) ([R]espect for the [R]ights of
[T]hird [P]ersons); and

e. Threatening the licenses and livelihoods of Ms. Richards and Ms. Douglas
as leverage to settle his detainer action against Ms. Douglas, in violation of
RPC 8.4(d) ([M]isconduct-[A]dministration of [J]ustice).

Third, the Hearing Panel made the following findings related to Mr. King’s
complaint:

As to the King complaint, the Panel found that Respondent committed the
following ethics violations:

a. Creating a concurrent conflict of interest between himself and his client,
Aaron King, by filing a civil action against Mr. King while still formally
representing him in the juvenile court child support case, in violation of RPC
1.7(a)(1) ([C]onflict of [I]nterest);

b. Improperly withholding Mr. King’s client file from Mr. King and his
attorney, Robert Kurtz, in violation of RPC 1.16(d) ([D]eclining or
[T]erminating [R]epresentation);

c. Knowingly and intentionally making false statements of fact to Judge Scott
Green that (i) Respondent previously had “conversations” with the
Disciplinary Board which never occurred and (ii) Formal Ethics Opinion
2015-F-160 “is no longer valid law,” in violation of RPCs 3.3(a)(1) ([F]alse
[S]tatement to a [T]ribunal), 8.4(c) ([M]isconduct-
[D]ishonesty/[F]raud/[D]eceit/[M]isrepresentation), and 8.4(d)
([M]isconduct-[A]dministration of [J]ustice); and

d. Threatening to testify against Mr. King as to Mr. King’s reputation for
dishonesty in an effort to gain an advantage in Respondent’s case, in
violation of RPCs 1.7(a)(1) ([C]onflict of [I]nterest) and 1.16(d) ([D]eclining
or [T]erminating [R]epresentation).

Finally, the Hearing Panel made the following findings related to Ms. Dunn’s
complaint:

- 10 -
Respondent committed the following ethics violations relating to the Dunn
complaint:

a. Knowingly disobeying Local Rule 117.02 of the Anderson County
Chancery Court by failing to file his Answer on behalf of his client, Cherie
Dunn, no later than 48 hours prior to the scheduled court hearing, in violation
of RPCs 1.1 ([C]ompetence), 1.3 ([D]iligence), and 3.4(c) ([F]airness to
[O]pposing [P]arty and [C]ounsel); and

b. Knowingly filing the Answer on behalf of Complainant Dunn in draft
form, and without consideration of Ms. Dunn's comments and edits
concerning the content of the Answer, in violation of RPCs 1.1
([C]ompetence), 1.3 ([D]iligence), and 1.4(a) ([C]ommunication).

B. Hearing Panel’s Final Order

The Hearing Panel conducted a hearing to resolve the remaining allegations of
ethical violations made against Mr. Schuchardt, and to determine an appropriate sanction.
The Hearing Panel considered the following issues in its Final Order:

a. Whether [Mr. Schuchardt] violated RPCs 1.1 ([C]ompetence) and 1.4(a)
([C]ommunication) by filing a complaint in the Knox County Fourth Circuit
Court on behalf of [Ms.] McBryar that sought “shared custody” of a minor
child and “spousal support” without affirmatively stating a cause of action
for divorce—even though [Mr. Schuchardt] knew Ms. McBryar wanted a
divorce and even though he invoked the Tennessee divorce statute . . . ;

b. Whether [Mr. Schuchardt] violated RPCs 1.1 ([C]ompetence) and 3.4(c)
([F]airness to [O]pposing [P]arty and [C]ounsel) by failing to submit a
proposed temporary parenting plan with the Circuit Court Complaint, as
required by Fourth Circuit Court Local Rule 15(A);

c. Whether [Mr. Schuchardt] violated RPC 1.1 ([C]ompetence) by failing to
include, on the Circuit Court Summons, the best-known address for
Defendant [Ms. Lefler], even though Respondent explicitly stated her
Oregon address in the body of the complaint;

d. Whether [Mr. Schuchardt] violated RPCs 1.1 ([C]ompetence) and 1.3
([D]iligence) by failing to effectuate service upon [Ms. Lefler] in the Circuit
Court case, after her Tennessee address became known through [Ms.
Lefler’s] competing Chancery Court Complaint;

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e. Whether [Mr. Schuchardt] violated RPC 1.1 ([C]ompetence) by
concluding that the second-filed Chancery Court action filed by [Ms. Lefler]
“mooted” Respondent’s first-filed action in the Fourth Circuit Court;

f. Whether [Mr. Schuchardt] violated RPCs 1.1 ([C]ompetence) and 3.4(c)
([F]airness to [O]pposing [P]arty and [C]ounsel) by failing, in the Knox
County Chancery Court action, to comply with Knox County Chancery Court
Local Rule 13(b) by not providing in his “first filing” a recitation of all
information required by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act;

g. Whether [Mr. Schuchardt] violated RPC 1.1 ([C]ompetence) by seeking
“spousal support” in the first sentence of a three-page “Motion for Custody
Order” that never affirmatively asked for “custody”; and

h. Whether [Mr. Schuchardt] violated RPCs 1.4 ([C]ommunication) and
1.16(d)(1)-(2) ([D]eclining or [T]erminating [R]epresentation) by failing to
provide reasonable notice to [Ms.] McBryar regarding his withdrawal from
representation and thereby failing to allow sufficient time for engagement of
new counsel.

The Hearing Panel found that the Board failed to prove “a,” “c,” “d,” and “e” by a
preponderance of the evidence, but did prove “b,” “f,” “g,” and “h.”12

First, the Hearing Panel addressed RPC 1.1 (Competence) in connection with Mr.
Schuchardt’s representation of Ms. McBryar. The Hearing Panel found that Mr.
Schuchardt’s failure to state divorce as the cause of action or include it in a prayer for
divorce in the complaint violated RPC 1.1. The Hearing Panel found that a reprimand was
the presumptive sanction.

Second, the Hearing Panel addressed RPCs 1.3 (Diligence) and 1.4(a)–(b)
(Communications with the Client). In the context of Ms. McBryar’s complaint, the
Hearing Panel found that Mr. Schuchardt’s failure to conduct discovery and support the
motions he filed on behalf of Ms. McBryar violated RPCs 1.3 and 1.4(a)–(b). The Hearing

12
As to the allegations in paragraph “g,” the Hearing Panel found that the Board proved, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. Schuchardt violated RPC 1.1 (Competence) by seeking “spousal
support” in the first sentence of a three-page “Motion for Custody Order” that never affirmatively asked
for “custody”. In making this finding, the Hearing Panel omitted the fact that Mr. Schuchardt’s “Motion
for Custody Order,” albeit in the body and not the prayer for relief, affirmatively stated that “[t]he movant,
Jamie McBryar, respectfully seeks custody of Hannah [McBryar].” So, while it is true that Mr. Schuchardt
sought “spousal support” in a “Motion for Custody Order,” which implicates RPC 1.1 (Competence), it is
not accurate to state that “the body of the document never affirmatively requested the relief specified in its
title.”
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Panel found that disbarment was the presumptive sanction because Mr. Schuchardt’s rule
violations were egregious and caused serious injury to Ms. McBryar. The Hearing Panel
also considered Ms. Rubenfeld’s testimony that Mr. Schuchardt’s lack of diligence and
failure to pursue discovery “seriously compromised Ms. McBryar’s ability to obtain
spousal support and custody of the child at issue.” The Hearing Panel also addressed RPCs
1.3 and 1.4(a)–(b) in the context of Ms. Dunn’s complaint. The Hearing Panel found that
Mr. Schuchardt’s failure to timely file a response to the conservatorship petition and failure
to draft the response in accordance with Ms. Dunn’s comments violated RPCs 1.3 and
1.4(a)–(b). The Hearing Panel found that a reprimand was the presumptive sanction.

Third, the Hearing Panel addressed RPC 1.16(d) (Terminating Representation). In
the context of Ms. McBryar’s complaint, the Hearing Panel found that Mr. Schuchardt’s
openly hostile and uncooperative conduct violated RPC 1.16 and caused serious injury and
serious potential injury to Ms. McBryar. In the context of Mr. King’s complaint, the
Hearing Panel found that Mr. Schuchardt’s failure to turn over Mr. King’s client file, which
“forc[ed] [his] attorney to subpoena the file[,]” also violated RPC 1.16. The Hearing Panel
found that Mr. Schuchardt caused Mr. King serious potential harm and placed his own
pecuniary interest in collecting unpaid fees over the interests of his client. Accordingly,
the Hearing Panel found that disbarment was the presumptive sanction for these rule
violations.

Fourth, the Hearing Panel addressed RPCs 4.4(a)(1) (Respect for the Rights of Third
Persons) and (8.4) (Misconduct) in the context of Mr. Hirschorn’s complaint. The Hearing
Panel found that Mr. Schuchardt’s multiple threats violated RPCs 4.4 and 8.4 and
demonstrated a disregard for basic principles of fairness and respect for others. The
Hearing Panel addressed the matters giving rise to the violations of RPC 8.4(c)–(d) in its
Summary Judgment Order. For both complaints, the Hearing Panel determined that the
presumptive sanction was disbarment. Additionally, the Hearing Panel found that Mr.
Schuchardt’s “explicit attempt to extract a quid pro quo” was incredibly destructive to the
legal system. Accordingly, the Hearing Panel found disbarment to be the presumptive
sanction.

The Hearing Panel also briefly addressed Mr. Schuchardt’s violations of RPCs
4.4(a)(1) (Respect for the Rights of Third Persons) and 8.4 (Misconduct) in relation to Mr.
King and Ms. Dunn’s complaints. The Hearing Panel found that disbarment was the
presumptive sanction for Mr. Schuchardt’s conduct in both complaints.

To summarize, the Hearing Panel found that Mr. Schuchardt violated the following
RPCs: 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a)–(c) (Communication), 1.5(b) (Fees),
1.7(a)(1) (Conflict of Interest: Current Clients), 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating
Representation), 3.2 (Expediting Litigation), 3.3(a)(1) (Candor Toward the Tribunal),
3.4(c) (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel), 4.2 (Communication with a Person
Represented by Counsel), 4.4(a)(1) (Respect for the Rights of Third Persons), 8.1(a) (Bar

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Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 8.2(a)(2) (Judicial and Legal Officials), and 8.4(a),
(d) (Misconduct). This list includes the Hearing Panel’s findings from both its Summary
Judgment Order and Final Order. In total, the Hearing Panel found that Mr. Schuchardt
committed forty-seven rule violations. Having found disbarment to be the presumptive
sanction for ten instances of the forty-seven rule violations, the Hearing Panel then
examined the following aggravating factors: past disciplinary offenses, dishonest/selfish
motive, pattern of misconduct/multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of disciplinary
proceedings and submission of false evidence during the disciplinary process, refusal to
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct, vulnerability of victims, and substantial
experience in the practice of law.

The Hearing Panel found that Mr. Schuchardt had a history of disciplinary offenses,
including discipline enforced by then-Chief Judge Pamela Reeves of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee and four other times by various courts.
The Hearing Panel also found that Mr. Schuchardt had a dishonest or selfish motive, as he
would often prioritize collecting his fees ahead of the interests of his clients like Ms.
McBryar and Mr. King.

The Hearing Panel also found that Mr. Schuchardt’s offenses reflected a “pattern
of misconduct,” as he committed a multitude of ethical violations throughout several
complaints.13 The Hearing Panel then found that Mr. Schuchardt engaged in bad faith
obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings and submitted false evidence during the
disciplinary process. For example, Mr. Schuchardt repeatedly claimed that Mr. Dustin
Welsh was present during the conservatorship hearing, even after evidence upon evidence
showed that was false. Moreover, during the disciplinary proceedings, Mr. Schuchardt
“repeatedly . . . asserted fantastic and wholly unsupported claims of hiding evidence, bias,
prejudice, criminal conduct, and conspiracy theories directed at . . . witnesses, other
members of the bar, disciplinary counsel, and the Board itself.” The Hearing Panel also
found as an aggravating factor that Mr. Schuchardt refused to acknowledge the wrongful
nature of his conduct. Instead, Mr. Schuchardt conducted a “campaign of character
assassination with respect to each of [the] individuals” who filed complaints against him.
The Hearing Panel found that all of these claims were made to “deflect attention from his
own conduct” and manifested an unwillingness to acknowledge his own wrongdoing.

The Hearing Panel found as an aggravating factor that several of the complainants
were vulnerable individuals. For example, Ms. McBryar did not have a college degree and
had limited knowledge about the workings of the legal system. Ms. McBryar was also of
modest financial means and “desperate for [Mr. Schuchardt’s] help[.]” Similarly, Mr.

13
In many cases, the same conduct can underly both the “prior disciplinary offenses” and “pattern
of misconduct” factors. See, e.g., Bd. of Pro. Resp. v. Daniel, 549 S.W.3d 90, 103 (Tenn. 2018) (noting
that “multiple instances of [misconduct] would underlie both the pattern of misconduct factor and multiple
offenses factor”).
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King, who was facing serious criminal charges and Mr. Schuchardt’s refusal to turn over
the file “potentially severely hampered Mr. King and his counsel.”

Finally, the Hearing Panel noted as an aggravating factor Mr. Schuchardt’s
“extensive experience in the practice of law.” Mr. Schuchardt has practiced law for
decades and, by his own account, “has had a long [and] distinguished career in the law.”14

Mr. Schuchardt and the Board stipulated to a single mitigating factor, that three
witnesses “would testify . . . that [Mr. Schuchardt] is a man of the highest level of
competence and integrity in . . . unrelated matters.” The Hearing Panel found no basis to
depart from the presumptive sanction of disbarment based on the aggravating factors and
sole mitigating factor. Accordingly, the Hearing Panel recommended disbarment. Mr.
Schuchardt appealed to the Knox County Chancery Court.

C. Trial Court Proceedings

The Trial Court found no basis to reverse or modify the Hearing Panel’s decision.
The Trial Court undertook an extensive review of the Hearing Panel’s Summary Judgment
Order and Final Order. The Trial Court examined the factual allegations of all four
complaints, the conclusions of law regarding the RPCs, and the propriety of the sanctions
imposed by the Hearing Panel. Following this thorough assessment, the Trial Court
“affirm[ed] the Hearing Panel’s decision in all regards.”

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court “is the final arbiter of the professional conduct of all lawyers practicing
in Tennessee.” Gray v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 710 S.W.3d 664, 673 (Tenn. 2025) (citing Sneed
v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 301 S.W.3d 603, 612 (Tenn. 2010)). When reviewing attorney
discipline appeals, we “seek[] to ensure that [disciplinary] rules are enforced in a manner
that preserves both the integrity of the bar and the public trust in our system of justice.” Id.
at 674 (citation omitted).

Our system provides ample process before a court or administrative body enforces
sanctions on an attorney. To begin, attorneys have the “right to an evidentiary hearing
before a panel.” Id. at 673 (citation omitted). Next, both the Board and the attorney have
the right to appeal a hearing panel’s decision to a circuit or chancery court. Id. (quoting
Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(b)). Finally, both parties have the right to appeal to this Court.
Id. (citing Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(d)).

14
See supra, n. 1.
- 15 -
On appeal, we review “the transcript of the record from the circuit or chancery court,
which shall include the transcript of evidence before the hearing panel.” Id. (quoting Tenn.
Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(d)). We reverse or modify a decision below only when it is:

(1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the
panel’s jurisdiction; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) arbitrary or
capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion; or (5) unsupported by evidence which is both
substantial and material in the light of the entire record.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(b).

When we find no grounds for reversal under subsections (1), (2), or (3), we must
uphold a hearing panel’s decision unless the decision was arbitrary or capricious, an abuse
of discretion, a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion, or unsupported by substantial
and material evidence. Bd. of Pro. Resp. v. Allison, 284 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tenn. 2009)
(quotation omitted). “A hearing panel abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect
legal standard or reaches a decision that is against logic or reasoning that causes an injustice
to the complaining party.” Manookian v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 685 S.W.3d 744, 777–78
(Tenn. 2024) (citation modified). A decision is supported by substantial and material
evidence “if it furnishes a reasonably sound factual basis for the decision being reviewed.”
Allison, 284 S.W.3d at 322 (quoting City of Memphis v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n of
Memphis, 216 S.W.3d 311, 316–17 (Tenn. 2007)).

Although we “do not substitute our judgment for that of the hearing panel as to the
weight of the evidence on questions of fact,” we review questions of law de novo. Maddux
v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 409 S.W.3d 613, 622 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Bd. of Pro. Resp. v. Cowan,
388 S.W.3d 264, 267 (Tenn. 2012)). We will uphold a sanction by the Hearing Panel when
the evidence before the Hearing Panel “furnishes a reasonably sound factual basis for the
decision being reviewed.” Sneed, 301 S.W.3d at 612 (quotation omitted). Even if
“reasonable minds can disagree” about the Hearing Panel’s sanction, we will uphold it
unless the decision is reversible under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, Section 33.1.
Harris v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 645 S.W.3d 125, 140 (Tenn. 2022) (quoting Bd. of Pro. Resp.
v. Sheppard, 556 S.W.3d 139, 146 (Tenn. 2018)).

III. ANALYSIS

From constitutional challenges to unconventional legal arguments, Mr. Schuchardt
leaves no stone unturned. Mr. Schuchardt makes many disparate arguments. We
categorize these arguments as Mr. Schuchardt did in the following manner: (A) due process
challenges; (B) fair hearing challenges; and (C) challenges to disbarment as a sanction. As
we explain below, several of Mr. Schuchardt’s arguments are waived under our rules of
appellate procedure. See Tenn. R. App. Proc. 27(a)(7)(A). Despite this waiver, we explain

- 16 -
why these arguments also fail on the merits. In addressing Mr. Schuchardt’s arguments,
we explain why the decisions below are supported by substantial and material evidence,
and do not demonstrate any abuse of discretion. We conclude by upholding the sanction
of disbarment against Mr. Schuchardt.

A. Due Process Challenges

Mr. Schuchardt’s first set of arguments contends that Tennessee’s hearing panel
system for attorney discipline violates due process. First, he claims that Tennessee’s
method for selecting hearing panel members does not comply with the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Next, he claims that the same selection method also
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, Mr.
Schuchardt claims that, for various reasons, panel members have an improper interest in
the outcome of attorney discipline cases, violating due process principles. We address each
argument in turn.
i. Due Process Clause

Mr. Schuchardt challenges Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 15.2(d), which
permits the Board to select hearing panel members based on a list of available attorneys.
Mr. Schuchardt claims that the Board, in selecting the panel, is afforded too much
discretion, violating his due process rights. See U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting
a state from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”).

We previously addressed similar arguments. In Hyman v. Board of Professional
Responsibility, Mr. Hyman “contend[ed] that the method for selecting hearing panel
members deprive[d] him of his right to due process under the United States and Tennessee
Constitutions.” 437 S.W.3d 435, 445 (Tenn. 2014) (citation omitted). We explained how
the procedural rights afforded to attorneys facing disciplinary proceedings were more than
sufficient for Fourteenth Amendment Due Process purposes. Id. at 446. “Our current
disciplinary framework provides adequate protection to attorneys who are accused of
professional misconduct and is not ‘in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions.’”
Id. (quoting Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 1.3); see also Moncier v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 406 S.W.3d
139, 156 (Tenn. 2013) (noting that Tennessee’s disciplinary framework provides sufficient
due process protections by giving lawyers notice and an opportunity to be heard, as well
as the right to have counsel present, cross examine witnesses, and present evidence). Mr.
Schuchardt’s due process arguments are threadbare and provide no reason to disturb our
prior case law. The hearing panel selection process did not violate Mr. Schuchardt’s due
process rights.

ii. Equal Protection Clause

In three perfunctory paragraphs, Mr. Schuchardt also claims that Tennessee’s
method for selecting hearing panel members violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
- 17 -
U.S. Constitution and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Other than the
citation to Brown, Mr. Schuchardt makes no attempt to relate that legal standard to his case.

Even when an issue “has been expressly raised,” if “the brief fails to include an
argument satisfying the requirements” of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27, it will
be deemed waived. City of Memphis v. Edwards ex rel. Edwards, No. W2022-00087-SC-
R11-CV, 2023 WL 4414598, at *2 (Tenn. July 5, 2023) (per curiam); see also Hodge v.
Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 335 (Tenn. 2012) (citing Baugh v. Novak, 340 S.W.3d 372, 381
(Tenn. 2011); Sneed, 301 S.W.3d at 615) (same). So, when a party raises an issue but fails
to “explain how the Panel or the trial court erred in resolving the issue,” we consider it
waived. Sneed, 301 S.W.3d at 614. It is not the responsibility of this Court to “scour[] the
appellate record for any reversible error the [court below] may have committed.” Donovan
v. Hastings, 652 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tenn. 2022) (quotation omitted). As here, where Mr.
Schuchardt fails to draw a connection between the Equal Protection Clause or Brown to his
case, we deem the argument waived. See, e.g., id. (deeming issue waived when litigant
failed to include “a sufficient argument”); Sneed, 301 S.W.3d at 614–15 (deeming issue
waived when litigant failed to explain Hearing Panel’s error); Forbess v. Forbess, 370
S.W.3d 347, 356 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (deeming issue waived when litigant’s argument
cited only one authority and did nothing to further advance a legal argument), perm. app.
denied (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2012); Bean v. Bean, 40 S.W.3d 52, 55–56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)
(“[A]n issue is waived where it is simply raised without any argument regarding its merits.”
(citation modified)), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 26, 2001).

But putting waiver aside, we do not view this argument as substantively different
from Mr. Schuchardt’s claim that the Hearing Panel selection method violates the Due
Process Clause to the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, this
argument fails for the same reasons discussed above.

iii. Improper Interest of Hearing Panel Members

Mr. Schuchardt next alleges that hearing panel members are “biased as a matter of
law.” Mr. Schuchardt makes several contentions in this regard, many of which overlap
with his due process arguments. We will address each one in turn.

First, Mr. Schuchardt claims that because hearing panel members are members of
the Board, the hearing panel members are per se biased in favor of the Board. According
to Mr. Schuchardt, the hearing panel members are agents for the Board—a litigant in this
matter. He goes on to contend that the members “owe their position on the panel – which
is an honor – to the Chairman of the Board.”

We addressed a similar argument in Long v. Board of Professional Responsibility,
where an attorney facing discipline argued that it was improper for the Board to have
investigatory, enforcement, and adjudicative processes all under the auspices of one

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authority. 435 S.W.3d 174, 186 (Tenn. 2014). We determined that the attorney’s due
process rights were not denied “[b]ecause the investigatory/enforcement responsibilities
and the adjudicative responsibilities are functionally separate within the Board.” Id. at 187;
see also Moncier, 406 S.W.3d at 163 (“[T]he Board’s performance of [] overlapping
functions does not, without more, establish bias or a constitutionally intolerable risk of
actual bias.”). We find no basis to modify our precedent.

Mr. Schuchardt’s arguments also fail to account for this Court’s rules and the
Board’s policies and procedures. First, hearing panels are comprised of attorneys who are
members of the district committee. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R 9, § 6.1. The district committee
members are appointed by the Tennessee Supreme Court, not the Chairman of the Board.
Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 6.1 (noting that the Tennessee Supreme Court appoints district
committees). Further, the appointment of the hearing panel must comply with this Court’s
rules and the Board’s policies. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9 § 15.2(d) (“The hearing panel shall
be selected pursuant to written procedures approved by the Board.”). Both this Court’s
rules and the Board’s policies and procedures provide limitations for who may be appointed
to a hearing panel. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 6.5 (“A district committee member shall not
take part in any matter in which a judge, similarly situated, would have to recuse himself
or herself in accordance with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10.”); Policies and Rules of the Bd. of Pro.
Resp. 2.2 (limiting hearing panel members to avoid conflicts of interest). Once assigned,
any “hearing panel members are compelled to recuse themselves if ‘a judge, similarly
situated, would have to recuse himself or herself.’” Hyman, 437 S.W.3d at 446 (quoting
Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 6.5) (citing Moncier, 406 S.W.3d at 160).15

15
In making this argument, Mr. Schuchardt failed to include in his brief the entirety of Policy 2.2,
which provides:

A. Following the service of the answer or upon failure to answer, the matter shall be
assigned by the Board Chair or the Vice-Chair to a hearing panel. Rule 9, § 15.2(d). In
assigning the members of the hearing panel, the Chair shall select them from the members
of the district committee in the district in which the respondent practices law with
consideration given to their availability and willingness to serve and to the number of
panels on which the Hearing Committee Member currently serves. If there is an insufficient
number of committee members in that district who are able to serve on the hearing panel,
the Chair or Vice Chair may appoint one or more members from the district committee of
an adjoining district to serve on the panel. Rule 9, § 15.2(d).

B. District committee members from the same law firm or office may not serve together
on the same hearing panel.

C. District Committee Members may not participate in cases against respondent attorneys
defended by members or associates of their law firm.

D. District Committee Members are prohibited from serving on a hearing panel wherein a
judge is a respondent and the member practices before the judge.

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Like the attorney in Long, Mr. Schuchardt has failed to show how hearing panel
members generally, or those specifically presiding over his case, are per se biased against
attorneys facing discipline. See generally Long, 435 S.W.3d at 187–89. Accordingly, this
argument fails.

Second, Mr. Schuchardt claims that because the panel members are attorneys whose
licenses are regulated by the Board, counsel for the Board “can promise de facto immunity
to the panel members in future ethics cases, if the panel members decide cases” in a
particular way. Going one step further, Mr. Schuchardt claims that “[e]ven if no quid pro
quo is offered or discussed, the panel members have an economic incentive to keep [the
Board’s] counsel happy, by handling cases the way [the Board] counsel wants to resolve
the case.”

While Mr. Schuchardt offers plenty by way of insinuation and innuendo, this
argument is wholly without merit. The record is devoid of any evidence of untoward
dealings between the Board and the Hearing Panel. Nothing in the record indicates that
Hearing Panel members received immunity or pressure for certain results. Further, once
again, Mr. Schuchardt’s argument fails to recognize the rules of this Court. Panel members
are appointed by this Court, not disciplinary counsel. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 6.1. Also,
any action by disciplinary counsel must be approved by district committee members who
are appointed by this Court and not answerable to disciplinary counsel. See Tenn. Sup. Ct.
R. 9, § 6.1. And neither members of the Board nor district committee members receive
any payment for their services. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 4.4 (“Members shall receive no
compensation for their services.”). There is simply no incentive to “keep [the Board’s]
counsel happy.” This argument fails.

Third, Mr. Schuchardt claims that hearing panel members have a pecuniary interest
in the outcome of a case, denying him a fair and impartial arbitrator. Although Mr.
Schuchardt discusses several United States Supreme Court opinions that prohibit judges
from having a pecuniary interest that interferes with their role as neutral and detached
arbiters, Mr. Schuchardt fails to show any connection between those cases and his. Mr.
Schuchardt fails to argue, let alone provide evidence of, any pecuniary interest by the
hearing panel members. As we discussed above, failure to include an argument results in
the waiver of this issue. See Tenn. R. App. Proc. 27(a)(7); see also supra § A.ii. We also
find this contention to be wholly without merit.

E. A District Committee Member may not be assigned to a hearing panel if a complaint is
pending against the committee member.

F. A District Committee Member may continue to review Disciplinary Counsel’s
recommendations for dismissals, diversion and private informal admonitions regarding
complaints while a complaint is pending against that Committee Member.

Policies and Rules of the Bd. of Pro. Resp. 2.2.
- 20 -
Finally, Mr. Schuchardt claims that the Board is filing ethics cases for improper
purposes. In support of this argument, Mr. Schuchardt claims that attorneys in similar
situations have alleged that the Board pursues ethics complaints in retaliation for protected
speech. However, the record contains zero evidence—not even an insinuation—that the
Board brought these charges as retaliation against Mr. Schucardt. The record is similarly
devoid of any evidence or allegation of protected speech. This argument is wholly
irrelevant and also fails.

For these reasons, we reject Mr. Schuchardt’s claim that the hearing panel members
are per se biased.

B. Fair Hearing Challenges

Mr. Schuchardt raises eight arguments related to the fairness of his disciplinary
process. First, Mr. Schuchardt claims that the Hearing Panel denied him discovery on
material issues of fact. Second, Mr. Schuchardt contends that the rule delivered in Brady
v. Maryland should apply in his case. In his third, fourth, and fifth arguments, Mr.
Schuchardt raises challenges to the Hearing Panel’s grant of summary judgment and
findings on the merits. We find that these three arguments relate to the sufficiency of the
evidence against him. Sixth, Mr. Schuchardt claims that the Hearing Panel erred by
refusing to allow Mr. Schuchardt to call certain witnesses to testify as to mitigating
evidence. Seventh, Mr. Schuchardt argues that this Court erred by temporarily suspending
him without notice and an opportunity to be heard. Finally, Mr. Schuchardt argues that the
Hearing Panel erred by failing to consolidate another disciplinary matter against Mr.
Schuchardt with those discussed in this opinion. We address these arguments in turn and
explain why each fails.

i. Denial of Discovery

Mr. Schuchardt argues that the Hearing Panel prevented him from conducting
discovery on material issues of fact. This argument stems from Ms. Dunn’s case.
Specifically, Mr. Schuchardt claims that he was not allowed to depose Mr. Dustin Welsh—
the autistic child at issue in the conservatorship matter—Mr. Dustin Welsh’s brother, or
his school personnel regarding his whereabouts the day of the Chancery Court hearing.

In the disciplinary proceedings related to this matter, Mr. Schuchardt claimed that
Mr. Dustin Welsh was present during the conservatorship hearing. But “every other
witness present at the hearing with personal knowledge, including two members of the Bar,
testified that Dustin Welsh was not present and did not testify, and the Court’s Order
contemporaneously approved by [Mr. Schuchardt] reflected this.” The Hearing Panel
prevented Mr. Schuchardt from deposing Mr. Dustin Welsh or the others on this issue.
However, the Panel allowed Mr. Schuchardt to obtain attendance records for the child and
- 21 -
would re-visit the issue if the records indicated that the child was not in school the day of
the hearing. School attendance records, however, showed that Mr. Dustin Welsh was
present at school on the day of the hearing. Mr. Schuchardt admitted that he “was
apparently mistaken.”

Because it concerns a discovery dispute, we review the Hearing Panel’s decision for
abuse of discretion. Walwyn v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 481 S.W.3d 151, 165 (Tenn. 2015). We
find no such abuse here. The Hearing Panel allowed Mr. Schuchardt to obtain school
attendance records to determine whether Mr. Dustin Welsh was at school on the day of the
hearing. Mr. Schuchardt did not seek any other discovery or contend that he still needed
these depositions after school records showed that Mr. Dustin Welsh was in school on the
date of the hearing. More importantly, Mr. Schuchardt fails to show how the appearance
of Mr. Dustin Welsh at the Chancery Court hearing has any relevance to the merits of the
disciplinary complaints against him, and we can see none. We see no abuse of the Hearing
Panel’s discretion on this discovery issue.

ii. Brady v. Maryland

Mr. Schuchardt argues that he is entitled to dismissal because the Hearing Panel
failed to comply with Brady v. Maryland. In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held
that a criminal prosecutor’s failure to provide a defendant with exculpatory evidence
violated due process. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Mr. Schuchardt claims that Brady should
apply here because attorney disciplinary matters are “quasi-criminal,” a term the United
States Supreme Court has used in describing attorney discipline cases. In re Ruffalo, 390
U.S. 544, 551 (1968). However, Mr. Schuchardt fails to identify what, if any, evidence the
Board withheld from him in violation of Brady. Accordingly, this argument is waived.
See Newcomb v. Kohler Co., 222 S.W.3d 368, 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (“A skeletal
argument that is really nothing more than an assertion will not properly preserve a claim.”
(citing United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (per curiam))).

Even still, as this Court previously held, attorney discipline proceedings are not
criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Green v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 567 S.W.3d 700, 715 (Tenn.
2019) (“Disciplinary hearings are not criminal trials and do not include all the due process
protections that apply in criminal trials.” (citing Moncier, 406 S.W.3d at 157)); Walwyn,
481 S.W.3d at 171 (“[A]ttorney disciplinary proceedings are not criminal proceedings.”
(quoting Long, 435 S.W.3d at 186)).16 Because attorney discipline cases are not criminal
proceedings, the full panoply of protections afforded in criminal proceedings are often
inapplicable in attorney discipline cases. See, e.g., In re Sitton, 618 S.W.3d 288, 295 (Tenn.
2021) (“Attorney disciplinary proceedings are not criminal proceedings in which there is a

16
Other courts have reached similar holdings. See Matter of Roberts, 877 S.E.2d 266, 270 (Ga.
2022) (declining to apply Brady in attorney discipline case); Smigelski v. Dubois, 100 A.3d 954, 967 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2014) (same).
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presumption of innocence.” (citations omitted)); Mabry v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 458 S.W.3d
900, 907 (Tenn. 2014) (“[T]here is no Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel in an attorney disciplinary proceeding.” (citation omitted)). Like the presumption
of innocence in Sitton and the right to effective assistance of counsel in Mabry, the
protections of Brady v. Maryland simply do not apply in Mr. Schuchardt’s case. Setting
aside the waiver of this issue, Mr. Schuchardt’s argument is meritless.

iii. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Mr. Schuchardt next makes three different arguments that all essentially challenge
the sufficiency of the evidence against him. First, Mr. Schuchardt claims that the Hearing
Panel failed to comply with the plain meaning of the law on thirty-nine issues. Second,
Mr. Schuchardt claims that the Hearing Panel’s conclusions are not based on evidence.
Third, Mr. Schuchardt claims that the Hearing Panel granted summary judgment despite
thirty issues of material fact.

First, we find all of these arguments waived. These arguments consist largely of
unsupported claims of legal error or disputes of fact without identifying either the error or
the fact in support. Each of these arguments reference lengthy charts that list the allegations
made against him and purported citations to the applicable law via citations to an
appendix.17

Mr. Schuchardt relies on this Court to make his arguments for him. See Dunkel,
927 F.2d at 956 (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”); see also
Bd. of Pro. Resp. v. Justice, 577 S.W.3d 908, 924 n.16 (Tenn. 2019) (declining to consider
certain arguments that are “too outlandish to dignify with discussion” or “absurd”). As we
explained above, our rules of appellate procedure require litigants to “includ[e] the reasons
why [their] contentions require appellate relief, with citations to the authorities and
appropriate references to the record.” Tenn. R. App. Proc. 27(a)(7)(A). Accordingly,
because Mr. Schuchardt fails to make a legal argument regarding these issues, we deem
them waived. See, e.g., Yebuah v. Ctr. for Urological Treatment, PLC, 624 S.W.3d 481,
491 (Tenn. 2021) (deeming issue waived when party’s brief “merely mention[s] potential
‘constitutional problems’ without properly explaining or giving adequate legal support for
such claims” (citation modified)); Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 33 n. 17 (Tenn. 2013)

17
It appears that the “applicable law” section of Mr. Schuchardt’s charts references two appendices
filed with his principal brief. But his principal brief, including the attached appendices, fail to comply with
our rules of appellate procedure. First, his “applicable law” section references scattered portions of the
record, which do not constitute “citations to the authorities.” Tenn. R. App. Proc. 27(a)(7)(A). Second,
it seems that Mr. Schuchardt used an appendix to incorporate arguments he made in courts below by
reference, in an apparent attempt to circumvent our word limit for principal briefs. Tenn. R. App. Proc.
30(e). Although our rules contemplate the use of an appendix to a party’s brief, a party cannot use an
appendix to circumvent this Court’s word-count requirement. See Tenn. R. App. Proc. 28(a) (allowing
litigants to file an appendix).
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(deeming issue waived when party’s brief failed to “provide any argument or citation to
the record regarding [an] issue in the argument section of their brief” (citation modified)).

Nevertheless, we have soldiered on to ensure that the record contains substantial
and material evidence of the RPC violations found by the Hearing Panel. Upon review of
the voluminous record spanning thousands of pages, as illustrated by the summary of the
facts above, we find substantial and material evidence to support the Hearing Panel’s
findings that Mr. Schuchardt violated numerous RPCs. Accordingly, we find more than
enough evidence of Mr. Schuchardt’s misconduct. Mr. Schuchardt’s arguments regarding
the sufficiency of the evidence fail.

iv. Refusal of Witnesses

Additionally, Mr. Schuchardt takes issue with the Hearing Panel’s refusal to allow
him to call witnesses to testify regarding the quality of his legal services. According to Mr.
Schuchardt, this was reversible error. We disagree.

At his disciplinary hearing, Mr. Schuchardt and the Board stipulated that three
witnesses would have testified that Mr. Schuchardt represented them competently and with
integrity. Because of the stipulation, and the fact that the three proposed witnesses had no
personal knowledge of the disciplinary charges against Mr. Schuchardt in this case, the
Hearing Panel excluded them from testifying before the Panel but “consider[ed] what their
testimony would have been for purposes of mitigation.” The Hearing Panel allowed Mr.
Schuchardt to make offers of proof regarding the three witnesses. However, Mr.
Schuchardt declined, waiving the issue for review by failing to make a proper record. An
erroneous exclusion of evidence requires reversal only if the evidence would have affected
the outcome of the trial had it been admitted. Pankow v. Mitchell, 737 S.W.2d 293, 297–
98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). Reviewing courts cannot make this determination without
knowing what the excluded evidence would have been. Stacker v. Louisville & N. R.R.
Co., 61 S.W. 766, 766 (Tenn. 1901); Davis v. Hall, 920 S.W.2d 213, 218 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1995); State v. Pendergrass, 795 S.W.2d 150, 156 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). Accordingly,
the party challenging the exclusion of evidence must make an offer of proof to enable the
reviewing court to determine whether the trial court’s exclusion of proffered evidence was
reversible error. Tenn. R. Evid. 103(a)(2); State v. Goad, 707 S.W.2d 846, 853 (Tenn.
1986); Harwell v. Walton, 820 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). Appellate courts
will not consider issues relating to the exclusion of evidence when this tender of proof has
not been made. Dickey v. McCord, 63 S.W.3d 714, 723 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); Rutherford
v. Rutherford, 971 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); Shepherd v. Perkins
Builders, 968 S.W.2d 832, 833–34 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

We recognize that a hearing panel, like a trial court, has discretion in overseeing its
proceedings. See Hyder v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 696 S.W.3d 532, 542 (Tenn. 2024) (“Rulings
on the introduction of evidence are usually within the discretion of the trial judge and will

- 24 -
not be reversed except for an abuse of that discretion.” (citation modified)). We discern no
abuse of discretion in the Hearing Panel’s refusal to allow these three witnesses to testify.
Moreover, we see no prejudice to Mr. Schuchardt given the agreed stipulation of the parties
as to what these witnesses would have testified about and the Hearing Panel’s consideration
of this information. Accordingly, this argument fails.

v. Substantial Threat of Harm

On September 21, 2022, this Court issued an order temporarily suspending Mr.
Schuchardt from the practice of law after finding that Mr. Schuchardt posed a threat of
substantial harm to the public. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, Sec. 12.3. Mr. Schuchardt claims
that he did not receive notice or the opportunity for a hearing in connection with the
temporary suspension. This is false. Mr. Schuchardt received notice and had an
opportunity to dissolve the petition. In fact, he took advantage of this opportunity to be
heard by filing a Petition for Dissolution of the temporary suspension. In his petition, he
continued to make baseless allegations that showed he “pose[d] a threat of substantial harm
to the public.” Id. Accordingly, this argument fails.

vi. Failure to Consolidate

Mr. Schuchardt faces other disciplinary actions unrelated to the complaints before
us now. He argues that failure to consolidate those complaints with this matter was error.
Mr. Schuchardt provides no rule or case law that mandates consolidation. Indeed, other
than insinuations of misconduct by others in the other pending matters, Mr. Schuchardt
provides no argument as to how those cases and this matter are linked. Accordingly, this
argument fails.
C. Disbarment

We turn now to Mr. Schuchardt’s challenges to the sanction of disbarment. When
“determin[ing] the appropriate sanction for attorney misconduct, a hearing panel must
consider the applicable ABA standards.” Gray, 710 S.W.3d at 681 (citing Tenn. Sup. Ct.
R. 9, § 15.4(a)). After identifying “the presumptive sanction under the ABA [s]tandards,”
a hearing panel considers whether to increase or decrease that presumptive sanction based
on aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. (quoting Dunlap v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 595
S.W.3d 593, 612 (Tenn. 2020)).

Here, the Hearing Panel did just that. It first applied ABA standards 4.41, 4.42, 4.43
4.51, 4.52, 4.53, 4.54, 6.11, 7.1, and 7.2 in determining an appropriate sanction. Under
some of those standards, disbarment was the presumptive sanction. Under others, a lesser
penalty like suspension or a reprimand was the presumptive sanction. Applying three of
these standards to multiple violations, the Hearing Panel found that disbarment was the

- 25 -
presumptive sanction.18 Next, the Hearing Panel found the following aggravating factors
applicable: (a) prior disciplinary offenses; (b) dishonest or selfish motive; (c) pattern of
misconduct/multiple offenses; (d) bad faith obstruction of disciplinary
proceeding/submission of false evidence during disciplinary process; (e) refusal to
acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; (f) vulnerability of victim; and (g) substantial
experience in the practice of law. Finally, the Hearing Panel considered mitigating factors
and found one mitigating factor applicable: that three of Mr. Schuchardt’s former clients,
each without any knowledge of the facts of this case, would testify to his high level of
competence as a lawyer and personal integrity.

Mr. Schuchardt raises four specific issues with the sanction of disbarment. We will
address each in turn. First, Mr. Schuchardt claims that the Board failed to establish that he
violated any duties as counsel and as such the sanction is inappropriate. As explained
above, there is ample evidence in the record to support multiple findings of misconduct.
Thus, this issue is without merit.

Second, Mr. Schuchardt contends that there is no evidence of damages as required
to support disbarment. Astonishingly, he claims that he is the only one damaged. This is
false. The complainants discussed above show how Mr. Schuchardt’s conduct caused both
serious injury and serious potential injury. Ms. McBryar had to find counsel at the final
hour, and had her case delayed for months. Mr. Schuchardt’s threats to and harassment of
Mr. Hirschorn and his clients damaged the administration of justice. Mr. King was forced
to subpoena his own client file, causing delay and requiring Mr. King to pay for the
subpoena. We also note that, during the proceedings of Ms. Dunn’s complaint, Mr.
Schuchardt made several false statements to the Hearing Panel and declined to retract them.
Accordingly, this argument fails.

Third, Mr. Schuchardt contends that a sanction of disbarment is inconsistent with
other Tennessee disciplinary cases. While Mr. Schuchardt cites to three different
disciplinary cases, he makes no attempt to explain how those cases are similar to his.19 He
summarily concludes that “Tennessee does not provide for disbarment in the instances
before the Court.” We disagree.

18
As we discussed above, the Hearing Panel made two factual findings that, in our view, require
added context and detail, as these facts were incomplete as stated by the Hearing Panel. See supra, n. 11 &
12. However, the outcome for Mr. Schuchardt does not change, because the Hearing Panel recommended
a reprimand, not disbarment, for Mr. Schuchardt’s violations of RPC 1.1 related to these two violations.
Because evidence in the record conflicts with the Hearing Panel’s findings we disregard them. Removing
these violations from consideration does not affect the Hearing Panel’s recommended sanction of
disbarment.
19
Mr. Schuchardt references the following cases: Sallee v. Board of Professional Responsibility,
469 S.W.3d 18 (Tenn. 2015); Hyman, 437 S.W.3d 435; and Flowers v. Board of Professional
Responsibility, 314 S.W.3d 882 (Tenn. 2010).
- 26 -
Finally, Mr. Schuchardt contends that the Hearing Panel failed to consider
mitigating factors. Specifically, Mr. Schuchardt claims that the following factors should
be found as mitigating circumstances: (1) his lack of disciplinary record; (2) that he did not
have a dishonest or selfish motive;20 and (3) his reputation and character, evidence of which
allegedly includes a book he was writing about currency, his pro bono work, that he is
active in politics, that he prevented a private college from closing, and that he is active in
his community.21

With regard to Mr. Schuchardt’s disciplinary record and motive, the Hearing Panel
clearly considered these factors. In fact, it found two of them to be aggravating factors.
The Hearing Panel found that Mr. Schuchardt had been disciplined once by the Eastern
District of Tennessee, twice by the Western District of Pennsylvania, once by the Middle
District of Tennessee, and once by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Accordingly, the
Hearing Panel properly held this to be an aggravating factor and not a mitigating one.

Additionally, the Hearing Panel considered Mr. Schuchardt’s argument that he had
no dishonest or selfish motive. It affirmatively held that Mr. Schuchardt put his personal
financial motives ahead of his clients, causing serious injury or serious potential injury,
and in other matters sought to gain personal advantage in his own cases. The record
supports this finding.

Finally, Mr. Schuchardt alleges that the Hearing Panel failed to consider his
character and reputation as a mitigating factor. This is false. The Hearing Panel
“accept[ed] [Mr. Schuchardt’s] proffered evidence” that three individuals would testify that
Mr. Schuchardt “is a man of the highest level of competence and integrity . . . as
establishing the mitigating factor of Mr. Schuchardt’s ‘character’ and ‘reputation.’”22
Although the Hearing Panel’s Final Order did not discuss all of the arguments Mr.
Schuchardt made regarding the mitigating factor of character/reputation, the Hearing Panel
credited the evidence presented and found Mr. Schuchardt’s “character” and “reputation”
as a mitigating factor. The fact that the Hearing Panel’s Final Order did not discuss at
length each of Mr. Schuchardt’s arguments as to this mitigating factor is unavailing.
Consequently, we find that the Hearing Panel appropriately considered mitigating factors.

20
Demonstrating his lack of remorse, in support of this point, Mr. Schuchardt contends that he “was
victimized by all of the complaining parties in this case.”
21
Like many of his other arguments, Mr. Schuchardt fails to comply with our rules in this part of
his brief—which lacks any reference to the record as to where he presented these facts or made these
arguments. See Tenn. R. App. Proc. 27(a)(7)(A) (requiring briefs to include appropriate references to the
record).
22
However, despite the “Hearing Panel credit[ing] this evidence and find[ing] the existence of this
mitigating factor,” the Hearing Panel noted that it was of limited value because the three proffered witnesses
had “no first-hand knowledge of the substantive facts in [Mr. Schuchardt’s] case.”
- 27 -
The Hearing Panel aptly observed how these proceedings have “dealt with
fundamental duties of competence, diligence, trust, honesty, and professionalism that every
attorney owes to his or her clients, to members of the bar, and to the judicial system.”
Considering the entire record in this matter, the only appropriate sanction is disbarment.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Hearing Panel’s decision was supported by substantial and material evidence
and was neither arbitrary and capricious nor an abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm
the judgment of the Chancery Court and the decision of the Hearing Panel to disbar Mr.
Schuchardt. The costs of this appeal are taxed to Mr. Schuchardt, for which execution may
issue if necessary.

MARY L. WAGNER, JUSTICE

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