Inquiry is made concerning the propriety of representing litigants upon
employment of a paralegal who had duties involving opposing parties while
formerly employed by adverse counsel.
The paralegal, while employed by the former lawyer, engaged in activities relating to each client
including taking statements from clients and witnesses, reviewing statements of clients and
witnesses, reviewing memoranda, reviewing medical records, daily reviewing, monitoring and
updating files and other duties generally performed by paralegals.
While employed by the present lawyer the paralegal has been, and will be, screened and isolated
from all the files and activities relating to the cases wherein the former lawyer-employer is
adverse counsel. The present lawyer-employer has not permitted, and will not permit, the
paralegal to disclose any confidences and secrets obtained in the former employment.
There are approximately six legal matters presently pending involving personal injury and
worker's compensation claims in which the paralegal performed duties on behalf of the former
employer wherein the former employer and present employer of the paralegal are representing the
opposing parties. The former employer-lawyer has advised his clients that the paralegal in
question is now employed by the lawyer representing their adversary, but did not explain that
there was an effort to screen and isolate the paralegal from activities relating to the case. The
parties represented by the former employer-lawyer have expressed concern and a feeling of being
placed at a disadvantage as a result of the paralegal now working for the lawyer of the opposing
The question to be resolved is whether screening and isolation methods and procedures are viable
and permissible means of avoiding the ethical disqualification of an attorney upon employment
of a paralegal who had duties involving pending cases while formerly employed by adverse
The Board previously addressed the same general issue in Formal Ethics Opinion 81-F-5 in a
matter involving a lawyer changing law firms. The opinion citing ABA Formal Opinion 134
(1935), City of Cleveland vs. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, 440 F.Supp. 193, N.C.
Ohio (1977); Aff'd 573 F.2d 1310 (CA 6, 1977); General Electric Co. v. Valeron Corp., 608 F.2d
265 (CA 6, 1979); Novo Terapeutisk v. Baxter Travenol, 607 F.2d 186 (CA 7, 1979); and Trone
v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994 (CA 9, 1980) stated;
Even though the attorney did not participate, with
his new firm, in any of the cases which he had
previously been handling on the other side, the
potentiality of his revealing confidential information
to his new partners, and the
87-F-110 Page 2
justifiable apprehension of his former clients that
he might do so, would be sufficient to disqualify the
In the recent case of Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098 (CA 10, 1985) the Court found that a
lawyer's move from one firm to another dooms his new firm's chance to represent one of the
lawyer's old opponents, despite the fact that the lawyer has been totally uninvolved in the case in
his new firm. The Court stated,
Disqualification is required if a substantial
relationship exists between the pending suit and the
matter in which the challenged attorney previously
represented the client. Substantiality is present if
the factual contexts of the two representations are
similar or related.
Once a substantial relationship is found, a
presumption arises that a client has indeed revealed
facts to the attorney that require his disqualification.
This presumption is irrebuttable.
The conclusion that the two matters are
substantially related gives rise to a second
presumption that the attorney shared information
with his partners, thereby requiring the
disqualification of the entire firm. A limited
exception has been recognized where the firm can
prove that the attorney involved ... has been
effectively screened ... . The sufficiency of
screening procedures must be evaluated case-bycase.
... The firm must have in place specific
institutional mechanisms to block the flow of
This Court need not decide whether to adopt this
exception; no specific institutional mechanisms
designed to prevent inadvertent disclosure were in
place when the firm accepted the case.
The screening exception is disapproved as a method of preventing vicarious disqualification
wherein there is a potential for harm. In this instance a potential harm exists. In the absence of
the informed consent of all the parties the lawyer is ethically prohibited from representing
litigants upon employment of a paralegal in instances wherein the paralegal had duties involving
opposing parties while formerly employed by adverse counsel.
87-F-110 Page 3
This 10th , day of June , 1987.
W. J. Flippin
Henry H. Hancock
Edwin C. Townsend
APPROVED AND ADOPTED BY THE BOARD