81-F-18 - Representation of Law Enforcement Association


Pursuant to Section 26 of Rule 9 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, the
Board has been asked for a formal opinion as to whether the members of a
firm which serves as general counsel for the Tennessee Law Enforcement
Officers Association are disqualified from engaging in the practice of
criminal law. As general counsel for the Association, the firm gives
general corporate advice, tax advice, passes on compliance with
governmental regulations, passes on the legality of death benefit claims,
and engages in a general corporate practice insofar as the Association is
concerned. It does not engage in the representation of individual officer

The Supreme Court of Kentucky recently held that an attorney who represents the
Fraternal Order of Police in grievances and other civil matters may not practice criminal
law in the same jurisdiction. In re: Advisory Opinion of Kentucky Bar Association, 613
S. W. (2d) 416. The Court went on to say:

It is fundamental that energetic representation of criminal
defendants often entails vigorous cross-examination of
police officers with an eye to discrediting their testimony.
Presented with the dilemma of alienating a group of police
officers on the one hand and providing a criminal defendant
with the most energetic possible defense on the other, the
attorney faces a conflict which seriously endangers his
ability to zealously represent his client as is required by
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Canon 7 of Rule 8 of the Supreme Court requires that a lawyer should represent a client
zealously within the bounds of the law, and Canon 9 admonishes that a lawyer should
avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.

While we agree with the Kentucky Supreme Court's opinion, we do not believe that it is
applicable to the facts here presented or that there is any reason why the firm members
could not engage in the practice of criminal law in compliance with the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

If a situation should develop where such criminal defendant representation might alienate
the officers or directors of the
Association, or jeopardize the corporate representation, then and in such event the
Kentucky Supreme Court rule would apply.

This 26th day of August , 1981.


Joseph G. Cummings
F. Evans Harvill
John R. Rucker